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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In “toxic tort” lawsuits, or claims brought as a result of 
exposure to hazardous substances, a typical plaintiff “alleges he has 
developed a disease because of exposure to a toxic substance 
negligently released by the defendant.”1  In some cases, however, 
the plaintiffs “seek to recover the costs of long-term diagnostic 
testing and medical examinations, which they claim are necessary 
to detect latent diseases or ailments that might later develop as a 
result of toxic exposure.”2  This novel theory of recovery is 
 
 1. Henry v. Dow Chem. Co., 701 N.W.2d 684, 686 (Mich. 2005). 
 2. Daniel L. Martens & Ernest J. Getto, Medical Monitoring and Class Actions, 
17 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 225, 225 (2003); see also Ayers v. Twp. of Jackson, 525 
A.2d 287, 308 (N.J. 1987) (stating a claim for medical monitoring expenses “seeks 
to recover the cost of periodic medical examinations intended to monitor 
2
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frequently labeled “medical monitoring.”3  Plaintiffs bringing 
claims for medical monitoring “seek post-exposure, pre-symptom 
recovery for the expense of periodic medical examinations to 
detect the onset of physical harm.”4  Plaintiffs who bring actions 
seeking the establishment of a medical monitoring fund may not 
suffer any current physical injuries and often do not even exhibit 
symptoms of disease as a result of their alleged exposure.5 
Many courts are “tempted to permit recovery for medical 
monitoring because the claims have ‘emotional and political 
appeal’ and [because] our society has developed a ‘heightened 
sensitivity to environmental issues.’”6  Thus, some courts across the 
country have permitted recovery for medical monitoring absent 
present physical injury.7  Other jurisdictions, however, have 
rejected recovery for medical monitoring absent present physical 
injury because of the “inherent complexities and significant public 
 
plaintiffs’ health and facilitate early diagnosis and treatment of disease caused by 
plaintiffs’ exposure to toxic chemicals”). 
 3. Allan L. Schwartz, Annotation, Recovery of Damages for Expense of Medical 
Monitoring to Detect or Prevent Future Disease or Condition, 17 A.L.R. 5th 327 (2005).  
Medical monitoring is also sometimes referred to as “medical surveillance.”  Id. 
 4. Victor E. Schwartz et al., Medical Monitoring—Should Tort Law Say Yes?, 34 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1057, 1058 (1999); see also Wood v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., 82 
S.W.3d 849, 856 (Ky. 2002) (“Under this theory, a defendant is required to pay a 
plaintiff for the anticipated costs of checkups and procedures aimed at detection 
and early treatment of any disease that may arise in the future as a result of 
tortious exposure.”).  The claim for medical surveillance is distinct from a claim 
for so-called “enhanced risk.”  The Supreme Court of New Jersey in Ayers has been 
frequently quoted, explaining the difference as “[t]he enhanced risk claim seeks a 
damage award, not because of any expenditure of funds, but because plaintiffs 
contend that the unquantified injury to their health and life expectancy should be 
presently compensable, even though no evidence of disease is manifest.”  525 A.2d 
at 304.  On the other hand, “the claim for medical surveillance . . . seeks specific 
monetary damages measured by the cost of periodic medical examinations . . . [to] 
redress . . . the fact that plaintiffs have been advised to spend money for medical 
tests, a cost they would not have incurred absent their exposure to toxic 
chemicals.”  Id. 
 5. Martens & Getto, supra note 2, at 225. 
 6. Schwartz et al., supra note 4, at 1059 (quoting Susan L. Martin & Jonathan 
D. Martin, Tort Actions for Medical Monitoring: Warranted or Wasteful?, 20 COLUM. J. 
ENVTL. L. 121, 121 (1995)); see also James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, 
Asbestos Litigation Gone Mad: Exposure-Based Recovery for Increased Risk, Mental Distress, 
and Medical Monitoring, 53 S.C. L. REV. 815, 837 (2002) (“Another reason for the 
intuitive appeal of medical monitoring claims is that asbestos and other toxic 
substances have come to epitomize the evils of ruthless industrial technology in 
the public eye, and the plaintiffs are quintessentially innocent victims of 
wrongdoing.”). 
 7. See infra Part IV.A. 
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policy concerns” surrounding the awards.8  Finally, others have yet 
to rule on the issue.9 
This Note begins by tracing the evolution of medical 
monitoring, including a discussion of the leading cases.10  It then 
examines Minnesota’s treatment of medical monitoring.11  Next, 
this Note evaluates the state of medical monitoring in various other 
states and jurisdictions.12  This Note further discusses the 
competing policy perspectives supporting various tests for medical 
monitoring.13  Finally, it suggests the proper standard for the review 
of medical monitoring issues in Minnesota, while encouraging 
Minnesota courts to leave the issue to the legislature altogether.14 
II.  THE DEVELOPMENT OF MEDICAL MONITORING 
One of the “fundamental principles” of tort law over the past 
two hundred plus years has been the theory that liability should not 
be imposed without proof of a physical injury.15  The reason for this 
injury requirement is to “give security to the rights of individuals by 
putting within their reach suitable redress whenever their rights 
have been actually violated.”16  Thus, tort law provides relief to an 
individual under general tort theory only when they have suffered 
an actual injury to person or property.17 
 
 8. Schwartz et al., supra note 4, at 1059; see infra Part IV.B. 
 9. See infra Part IV.C. 
 10. See infra Part II. 
 11. See infra Part III. 
 12. See infra Part IV. 
 13. See infra Parts V-VI. 
 14. See infra Parts VI-VII. 
 15. See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 54 (4th ed. 
1971); see also Henry v. Dow Chem. Co., 701 N.W.2d 684, 688-89 (Mich. 2005) 
(explaining that a present physical injury is required in the toxic tort context to 
recover under a negligence theory); Schwartz et al., supra note 4, at 1074 (“For 
over two hundred years, a fundamental principle of tort law has been that liability 
should only be imposed when a person has suffered an injury.”). 
 16. COOLEY ON TORTS § 32 (4th ed. 1932). 
 17. See Henry, 701 N.W.2d at 689.  More eloquently stated: 
Before any violation has in fact taken place, the law assumes that none 
will happen; but that each individual will respect the rights of all others.  
Therefore, it does not undertake in general to provide preventive 
remedies; it gives them in a few exceptional cases, which stand on 
peculiar grounds, and in which the mischiefs flowing from an invasion of 
rights might be such as would be incapable of complete redress in the 
ordinary methods, or perhaps in any manner.  In most cases it is assumed 
that, if the law places within the reach of every one a suitable remedy to 
which he may resort when he suffers an injury, it has thereby not only 
4
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While this narrow principle may appear harsh, especially when 
examining some sympathetic plaintiffs, “it is the best filter the 
courts have been able to develop to prevent a flood of claims, to 
provide faster access to courts for those with ‘reliable and serious’ 
claims,18 and to ensure that defendants are held liable only for 
genuine harm.”19  Medical monitoring claims that are brought by 
plaintiffs lacking present physical injury challenge this traditional 
“physical injury” rule in tort law.20  The following three cases 
illustrate how some courts have handled the issue of medical 
monitoring. 
A. Friends for All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. 
The first case to award medical monitoring damages was 
Friends for All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp.21  In Friends for 
All Children, Lockheed’s airplane was used in a rescue mission to 
evacuate Vietnamese children from Saigon near the end of the 
Vietnam War.22  Soon after takeoff, a locking system failed, causing 
the cargo doors and aft ramp to fall off the aircraft.23  In addition, 
the interior compartments of the plane decompressed resulting in 
a loss of oxygen.24  The plane later crashed, breaking into four 
large pieces and several smaller pieces.25  Many of the orphans were 
killed, although 149 of the infants survived.26 
An organization named Friends for All Children (FFAC), 
claiming to be the legal guardian for the surviving children, filed a 
claim in the United States District Court for the District of 
 
provided for him adequate protection, but has given him all that public 
policy demands.  The remedies that are aimed at wrongs not yet 
committed but only threatened, are so susceptible of abuse that they are 
wisely restricted within very narrow limits. 
COOLEY ON TORTS, supra note 16,  § 32, quoted in Henry, 701 N.W.2d at 689. 
 18. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 444 (1997). 
 19. Schwartz et al., supra note 4, at 1059. 
 20. Id. 
 21. 746 F.2d 816 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
 22. Id. at 819.  The rescue mission, nicknamed “Operation Babylift,” took 
place on April 4, 1975.  Id.  The Lockheed C5A Galaxy aircraft took off for the 
United States with 301 passengers on board, mostly Vietnamese infant orphans.  
Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id.  The surviving orphans were later sent to San Francisco where they 
were examined by U.S. military physicians, and subsequently released to their 
adoptive parents.  Id.   
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Columbia.27  FFAC alleged that the accident resulted from 
Lockheed’s negligent manufacture of the plane.28  FFAC further 
claimed that because of the decompression and the crash itself, the 
survivors suffered from a neurological development disorder.29  
Thus, FFAC sought compensation from Lockheed for diagnostic 
examinations and continued medical monitoring to determine if 
the decompression or the crash itself caused residual brain 
dysfunction syndrome in the children.30 
The district court granted partial summary judgment in favor 
of the orphan children adopted by non-U.S. parents.31  In doing so, 
the court held that Lockheed was liable for the cost of diagnostic 
examinations of the children.32  The court also entered an 
injunction ordering Lockheed to create a $450,000 fund from 
which reasonable costs of diagnostic examinations for the children 
living in France could be drawn.33  Lockheed appealed, arguing in 
part that tort law in the District of Columbia had not recognized a 
cause of action for placing a person at risk in the absence of proof 
of actual physical injury.34 
On review, the United States Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia first noted that the law of the District of Columbia was 
in fact “silent on the specific issue of whether a plaintiff may 
maintain an action for diagnostic examinations in the absence of 
proof that he or she was physically injured.”35  The court, however, 
 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id.  Lockheed in turn argued that the crash was caused by the negligent 
maintenance and operation of the plane by the U.S. Air Force.  Id. at 819-20.  
Thus, Lockheed decided to implead the United States as a third party defendant.  
Id. at 820. 
 29. Id. at 819.  The brain disorder was classified as Minimal Brain 
Dysfunction, or MBD.  Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 822.  Half of the adoptive parents were Europeans.  Id. at 819. 
 32. Id.  The court stated it could not “be reasonably disputed that the need 
for some diagnostic examinations . . . is itself a proximate result of this particular 
crash.”  Id.  
 33. Id. at 818-19.  While the foreign plaintiffs lived in a number of European 
countries, the court concluded that because the public health services in countries 
other than France were likely to pay for the examinations, the relief in the form of 
the fund should apply only to the French plaintiffs.  Id. at 822 n.7. 
 34. Id. at 823.  Lockheed further argued that “if the District of Columbia 
courts were presented with this action they likewise would decline as a matter of 
law to recognize it.”  Id. at 824. 
 35. Id.  Because the action was a diversity case, the court was obligated to 
apply the law of the District of Columbia.  See Anchorage-Hynning & Co. v. 
Moringiello, 697 F.2d 356, 360-61 (D.C. Cir. 1983).  The principle set forth in Erie 
6
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went on to predict that, if faced with the same question under 
similar circumstances, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals 
would recognize a cause of action for medical monitoring in the 
absence of physical injury.36  The court stated that its conclusion 
was supported by two fundamental purposes of tort law: “the 
deterrence of misconduct and the provision of just compensation 
to victims of wrongdoing.”37 
To aid in its determination of whether a cause of action for 
diagnostic examinations without proof of physical injury should 
exist, the court hypothesized an accident involving two individuals, 
Smith and Jones.38  The court stated: 
Jones is knocked down by a motorbike which Smith is 
riding through a red light.  Jones lands on his head with 
some force.  Understandably shaken, Jones enters a 
hospital where doctors recommend that he undergo a 
battery of tests to determine whether he has suffered any 
internal head injuries.  The tests prove negative, but Jones 
sues Smith solely for what turns out to be the substantial 
cost of the diagnostic examinations.39 
The court noted that, based on this example, even though 
there is an absence of physical injury, Jones should still be able to 
recover the costs for the diagnostic examinations proximately 
caused by Smith’s actions.40  The court similarly reasoned that here 
 
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) applies to federal courts in the District 
of Columbia when they exercise jurisdiction over state-created causes of action.  Id. 
 36. Friends for All Children, 746 F.2d at 824-25.  The court reasoned that 
general principles of tort law and the law of other jurisdictions supported its 
conclusion.  Id.  The court also concluded that the need for medical monitoring 
constituted an “injury” as defined by the Restatement (Second) of Torts.  Id. at 
826.  The Restatement defines “injury” as “the invasion of any legally protected 
interest of another.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 7 (1965).  The court 
reasoned that because “an individual has an interest in avoiding expensive 
diagnostic examinations just as he or she has an interest in avoiding physical 
injury,” when a person invades that interest such person “should make the plaintiff 
whole by paying for the examinations.”  Friends for All Children, 746 F.2d at 826. 
 37. Id. at 825.  The court also distinguished the cases from other jurisdictions 
referenced by Lockheed because such jurisdictions’ refusals to recognize a cause 
of action for diagnosis in the absence of present injury were grounded upon 
difficulties of speculative proof, which were not present here.  Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id.  The court noted that this conclusion will deter misconduct and 
complies with the normative justice concerns applicable to tort law.  Id.  Because 
the plaintiff’s need for medical services as a result of the accident was beyond the 
services necessitated by normal life activities, the motorbiker should consequently 
pay.  Id. 
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“no diagnostic examinations would be necessary ‘but for the fact 
that these children endured explosive decompression and hypoxia 
aboard [the] plane.’”41 
Despite its holding, the court of appeals was concerned with 
the potential hardship its decision would impose on the 
defendant.42  To ensure that plaintiffs would be prevented from 
recovering excessive damages, the court affirmed the order of the 
district court creating a fund from which money could be disbursed 
only upon submission of a voucher detailing the expenses 
anticipated and upon the defendant having the opportunity to 
respond to the potential disbursement.43  Moreover, in allowing a 
claim for medical monitoring expenses absent physical injury, it 
appears the court of appeals did not intend its decision to apply to 
cases where the “alleged injury to be compensated [is] speculative 
without the corroborative presence of physical injury.”44 
B.  Metro-North Commuter Railroad Co. v. Buckley 
In Metro-North Commuter Railroad Co. v. Buckley, the United 
States Supreme Court was faced with the question of whether a 
railroad worker, negligently exposed to asbestos but without 
symptoms of any disease, could recover under the Federal 
Employers’ Liability Act (FELA) for negligently inflicted emotional 
distress.45 
In Metro-North, the plaintiff worked as a pipefitter for Metro-
North, a railroad.46  For a period of three years, and for a time of 
roughly one hour per working day, the plaintiff’s job required him 
to remove insulation from pipes.47  After completing such work 
plaintiff would often be covered with insulation dust containing 
asbestos.48  After attending an “asbestos awareness” class, the 
plaintiff feared he would develop cancer as a result of his work.49  
He then sought periodic medical checkups for cancer and 
asbestosis, but those examinations did not reveal evidence of 
 
 41. Id. at 825 (quoting the district court’s Memorandum of Opinion). 
 42. Id. at 837-38. 
 43. Id. at 838 & n.42. 
 44. Id. at 826. 
 45. 521 U.S. 424, 426-27 (1997). 
 46. Id. at 427. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
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asbestos-related disease.50 
The plaintiff subsequently brought suit against Metro-North 
under FELA.51  Specifically, he sought damages for his emotional 
distress and to cover the expenses of future medical monitoring.52  
In response, Metro-North argued, inter alia, that FELA did not 
permit the plaintiff to recover for injuries because he had not 
suffered physical harm.53 
The district court dismissed the plaintiff’s claims, holding that 
the plaintiff did not “offer sufficient evidence to allow a jury to find 
that he suffered a real emotional injury.”54  The court also stated 
that the plaintiff suffered no “physical impact,” and therefore, any 
emotional injury suffered by the plaintiff fell outside the 
circumstances under which FELA permits recovery.55  The court did 
not address the plaintiff’s medical monitoring claim.56 
On appeal, the Second Circuit vacated the judgment and held 
that the plaintiff’s contact with the insulation dust fit within the 
definition of “physical impact” under FELA.57  Thus, the court held 
that the plaintiff could recover under FELA for any accompanying 
emotional distress.58  The court found that the plaintiff could 
recover only if he could prove that “by reason of the exposure to 
the toxic substance caused by the defendant’s negligence, a 
reasonable physician would prescribe . . . a monitoring regime 
different than the one that would have been prescribed in the 
absence of that particular exposure.”59  The plaintiff might then 
recover the costs of his medical checkups.60 
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the 
Second Circuit holding.61  The first question before the Court was 
whether the plaintiff’s physical contact with the dust amounted to 
“physical impact” for purposes of the plaintiff’s emotional distress 
 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id.  Under FELA, a railroad worker may recover damages for an “injury 
. . . resulting . . . from” his employer’s “negligence.”  45 U.S.C. § 51 (2000). 
 52. Metro-North, 521 U.S. at 427. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 428. 
 55. See id. 
 56. See id. 
 57. Buckley v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 79 F.3d 1337, 1345 (2d Cir. 
1996). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 1347 (internal quotation omitted). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Metro-North, 521 U.S. at 428. 
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claim pursuant to FELA.62  The Court held that “physical impact” 
does not include slight contact with a substance where the only 
physical harm is that the substance may cause a disease in the 
future.63 
More important to the topic of this Note, the Court also 
addressed the question of whether the plaintiff could recover the 
cost of future medical checkups he expected to incur to monitor 
for potential asbestos-related disease.64  By a vote of seven to two, 
the Court denied the plaintiff’s request for medical monitoring 
damages under FELA.65  The Court noted a number of concerns 
with allowing such a claim absent physical injury, including (1) the 
fact that distinguishing medical monitoring costs from the costs of 
routine medical care would be problematic for judges and juries;66 
(2) the notion that allowing recovery would soak up medical 
resources better left to “those more seriously harmed”;67 and (3) 
the fact that allowing such recovery would “ignore the presence of 
existing alternative sources of payment,” such as employers or 
insurance policies that may provide monitoring, leaving courts 
uncertain when calculating recoveries.68 
The Court was also concerned that such a remedy would 
produce a “flood” of cases and result in “unlimited and 
unpredictable liability.”69  Writing for the Court, Justice Breyer 
stated that the majority were “troubled . . . by the potential systemic 
effects of creating a new, full-blown, tort law cause of action.”70 
 
 62. Id. at 428-29. 
 63. Id. at 430.  The Court noted: 
[T]he words “physical impact” do not encompass every form of “physical 
contact.” . . . [T]hey do not include a contact that amounts to no more 
than an exposure . . . to a substance that poses some future risk of disease 
. . . and which contact causes emotional distress only because the worker 
learns that he may become ill after a substantial period of time. 
Id. at 432. 
 64. Id. at 438. 
 65. Id. at 443-44. 
 66. Id. at 441. 
 67. Id. at 442. 
 68. Id. at 442-43. 
 69. Id. at 442.  The Court was concerned that “tens of millions of individuals 
may have suffered exposure to substances that might justify some form of 
substance-exposure-related medical monitoring.”  Id. 
 70. Id. at 443-44.  The Court noted the likely effects on potential plaintiffs not 
before the court but who “depend on a system that can distinguish between 
reliable and serious claims . . . and unreliable and relatively trivial claims.”  Id. at 
444. 
10
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C.  Bower v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. 
Despite the holding of the U.S. Supreme Court in Metro-North, 
in 1999, West Virginia’s Supreme Court of Appeals became the 
most recent state court to recognize a cause of action for medical 
monitoring absent present physical injury.71  In Bower, the plaintiffs 
brought a claim in the Circuit Court of Marion County, West 
Virginia, alleging they were exposed to a number of toxic 
substances because defendants maintained a cullet pile containing 
debris from the manufacture of light bulbs.72  The plaintiffs sought, 
among other things, damages in the form of medical monitoring 
expenses.73  At the time the plaintiffs brought suit, none exhibited 
symptoms of disease related to their potential exposure.74 
The defendants removed the case to the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of West Virginia and later moved to 
dismiss the plaintiffs’ medical monitoring claim.75  The plaintiffs 
subsequently sought to certify to the West Virginia Supreme Court 
of Appeals the issue of whether medical monitoring damages were 
a recognized form of relief under West Virginia tort law.76  The 
district court asked the supreme court of appeals to resolve the 
following question: “In a case of negligent infliction of emotional 
distress absent physical injury, may a party assert a claim for 
expenses related to future medical monitoring necessitated solely 
by fear of contracting a disease from exposure to toxic 
chemicals?”77  In order to reach its holding on the issue of medical 
monitoring, however, the Bower court reformulated the certified 
question to read: “Whether, under West Virginia law, a plaintiff 
who does not allege a present physical injury can assert a claim for 
the recovery of future medical monitoring costs where such 
damages are the proximate result of defendant’s tortious 
conduct.”78 
 
 71. Bower v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 522 S.E.2d 424, 431 (W. Va. 1999). 
 72. Id. at 426.  The tests performed on the pile indicated the presence of 
thirty potentially toxic substances.  Id. at 427. 
 73. Id.  Plaintiffs brought claims for: (1) negligent maintenance and 
operation of the refuse pile, (2) nuisance, (3) trespass, (4) negligent infliction of 
emotional distress, and (5) intentional disregard for the health and safety of 
plaintiffs.  Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 427-28. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 428-29.  The court noted that it did not believe the district court 
11
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The court held that a present physical harm was not a 
prerequisite to bring a claim for medical monitoring.79  The court 
further noted that a plaintiff seeking medical monitoring costs is 
not even required to show a “probable likelihood that a serious 
disease will result from the exposure.”80  Rather, all a plaintiff must 
prove is that medical monitoring expenses are “necessary and 
reasonably certain to be incurred as a proximate result of a 
defendant’s tortious conduct.”81 
After determining that future medical monitoring expenses 
are available pursuant to West Virginia law absent a present 
physical injury, the court set forth the following six-part test 
necessary for a plaintiff to sustain an action for medical monitoring 
costs under West Virginia law: 
(1) [a plaintiff] . . . has . . . been significantly exposed; (2) 
to a proven hazardous substance; (3) through the tortious 
conduct of the defendant; (4) as a proximate result of the 
exposure, plaintiff has suffered an increased risk of 
contracting a serious latent disease; (5) the increased risk 
of disease makes it reasonably necessary for the plaintiff to 
undergo periodic diagnostic medical examinations 
different from what would be prescribed in the absence of 
the exposure; and (6) monitoring procedures exist that 
make the early detection of a disease possible.82 
Justice Maynard dissented in Bower, arguing that the majority 
lacked the authority to create a medical monitoring cause of action 
absent a present physical injury.83  Specifically, Justice Maynard was 
troubled that the court went beyond the “clear, concise and limited 
question” of the district court in an effort to satisfy the court’s 
“grand designs . . . despite the specific issue before it.”84  Justice 
Maynard was more disturbed, however, that the majority’s decision 
to engage in judicial lawmaking violated the constitutional doctrine 
of separation of powers by “usurping the Legislature’s authority to 
enact laws.”85  Finally, Justice Maynard criticized the majority for 
 
meant “to pose such a narrow question.”  Id. at 428.  Thus, the court used its 
power under West Virginia Code sections 51-1A-1 through 51-1A-13 to reformulate 
the question.  Id. 
 79. Id. at 430. 
 80. Id. at 431. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 432-33. 
 83. Id. at 434 (Maynard, J., dissenting). 
 84. Id. at 434-35. 
 85. Id. at 435. 
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rejecting the 200-year-old tort law rule requiring a present injury 
before allowing a plaintiff to recover damages, electing instead to 
favor a rule emphasizing “the speculative and amorphous showing 
of ‘increased risk.’”86 
III.  MINNESOTA CASE LAW DISCUSSING MEDICAL MONITORING 
Before analyzing the test that should be adopted by the 
Minnesota Supreme Court, it is important to briefly highlight 
previous Minnesota case law.  To date, the law of medical 
monitoring in Minnesota is rather undeveloped.  In fact, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court has yet to address the issue of medical 
monitoring and the Minnesota Court of Appeals has discussed the 
issue only once. 
A.  Werlein v. United States 
The first case to address the issue of medical monitoring in 
Minnesota was Werlein v. United States.87  In Werlein, the plaintiffs 
brought suit against a number of defendants for allegedly 
discharging chemical waste, including trichloroethylene (TCE), 
from the Twin Cities Army Ammunition Plant (TCAAP) and the 
“Trio Solvents” site.88  The plaintiffs lived near the two sites and 
claimed that their water supply was polluted by the defendants.89 
The plaintiffs filed actions under federal and state statutes 
governing toxic pollution.90  The plaintiffs also brought a number 
of common-law claims.91  In addition, the plaintiffs requested a 
 
 86. Id.  Justice Maynard suggested that because a plaintiff is “not required to 
show that a particular disease is certain or even likely to occur as a result of 
exposure,” as a result of the majority’s decision “plaintiffs will . . . be compensated 
when there is no injury, thus providing a windfall for plaintiffs.”  Id. 
 87. 746 F. Supp. 887 (D. Minn. 1990), vacated in part on other grounds, 793 F. 
Supp. 898 (D. Minn. 1992). 
 88. Id. at 890. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id.  The plaintiffs stated claims under the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675, 
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992, the 
Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376, the Minnesota Environmental 
Response and Liability Act (MERLA), MINN. STAT. §§ 115B.01-115B.20, and the 
Minnesota Environmental Rights Act (MERA), MINN. STAT. §§ 116B.01-116B.13.  
Id.  Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief under these statutes, asking the court to 
supervise the cleanup of contaminants at both sites.  Id. 
 91. Id.  Plaintiffs sought liability for nuisance, trespass, battery, and 
intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress.  Id.  Pursuant to such 
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medical monitoring fund, to be financed by the defendants, which 
would reimburse the plaintiffs exposed to the contaminants for the 
costs of medical screening.92  In response, the defendants brought 
motions for summary judgment and dismissal.93 
The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota 
held, inter alia, that medical monitoring costs could be recovered as 
tort damages under the common law of Minnesota.94  The court 
was careful to note, however, that the costs of medical monitoring 
were available only where a plaintiff could show that they had a 
present injury that increased their risk of future harm.95 
B.  Bryson v. Pillsbury Co. 
The only instance of a Minnesota state court discussing the 
issue of medical monitoring occurred in Bryson v. Pillsbury Co.96  In 
Bryson, the plaintiff’s horse fell into a pit filled with storm water.97  
The pit was also allegedly used by the plaintiff’s employer, a 
subsidiary of the defendant, to dispose of waste.98  The plaintiff 
entered the pit to rescue the horse and noticed Captan-treated 
seeds floating in the water.99  After rescuing the horse, the plaintiff 
later suffered from a recurring rash that covered her body.100 
The plaintiff brought an action against the defendant as a 
result of her exposure to Captan.101  The plaintiff argued that her 
exposure caused extensive chromosome breakage and an increased 
risk of developing cancer.102  The defendant moved for summary 
judgment on the grounds of assumption of risk and speculative 
 
claims, plaintiffs asked for monetary damages, including compensation for both 
personal and property damages caused by the contaminants.  Id. at 890-91. 
 92. Id. at 891.  Plaintiffs contended that medical monitoring expenses could 
be recovered both as a response cost under CERCLA section 107 and under the 
common law.  Id. at 901. 
 93. Id. at 890. 
 94. Id. at 904. 
 95. Id.  The court stated that when a plaintiff can show they have present 
injuries that increase the risk of future harm, “monitoring is . . . a [recoverable] 
future medical cost.”  Id. 
 96. 573 N.W.2d 718 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998). 
 97. Id. at 719. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id.  Captan is a chemical treatment for seed designed to protect the seed 
from insects when placed in the soil.  Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
14
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 3 [2006], Art. 14
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol32/iss3/14
13ABERSON.DOC 4/5/2006  1:35:02 PM 
2006] FIFTY-STATE SURVEY OF MEDICAL MONITORING 1109 
damages.103  The district court granted the defendant’s motion for 
summary judgment on the damages issue, because the plaintiff 
suffered no present injury and thus awarding damages for future 
harm was too speculative.104 
On appeal, the defendant argued that because the plaintiff’s 
alleged chromosome damage was asymptomatic, no present injury 
existed.105  Moreover, the defendant’s expert testified that “an 
elevated number of chromosome aberrations [is] not considered 
an ‘injury’ per se because they do not in and of themselves result in 
any physical impairment.”106  The plaintiff contended that the 
chromosome breakage resulting from her exposure to Captan was 
a “real and present physical and biologic injury.”107 
The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s 
grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant, stating that 
the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to raise a genuine factual 
issue as to whether the plaintiff’s chromosome breakage 
constituted a present injury.108  In doing so, the court quoted 
Werlein, stating that “it could not rule as a matter of law that 
plaintiffs’ alleged injuries [were] not ‘real’ simply because they 
[were] subcellular” and that “[i]t is for the trier of fact, aided by 
expert testimony, to determine whether the plaintiffs have suffered 
present harm.”109 
For the purposes of this discussion, it is important to note that 
although the court held that the determination of whether 
subcellular damage actually constituted a present physical injury is 
one for the trier of fact, the court did require a present physical 
injury to pursue medical monitoring costs. 
C.  Thompson v. American Tobacco Co. 
In Thompson v. American Tobacco Co.,110 the plaintiffs brought a 
claim alleging that the defendants participated in a large-scale 
fraudulent scheme to encourage people to either begin or 
continue smoking.111  The plaintiffs further alleged that the 
 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 720. 
 106. Id. at 721. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 720-21. 
 109. Id. at 721. 
 110. 189 F.R.D. 544 (D. Minn. 1999). 
 111. Id. at 547. 
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defendants’ scheme exposed them to diseases and illnesses, and 
required the plaintiffs to participate in medical monitoring 
programs.112  Thus, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants’ 
conduct constituted both common law and statutory fraud, and 
sought the establishment of a court-administered defendant-
funded medical monitoring fund.113 
The plaintiffs subsequently brought motions for class 
certification and to reserve individual injury and damage claims.114  
The U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota held, in 
relevant part, that the plaintiffs’ request for medical monitoring 
presented too many individual issues to permit certification.115  In 
so holding, the court stated “[g]iven the novelty of the tort of 
medical monitoring and that the Minnesota Supreme Court has yet 
to recognize it as an independent theory of recovery, this Court is 
not inclined at this time to find that such a tort exists under 
Minnesota law.”116 
D.  In re St. Jude Medical, Inc. Silzone Heart Valves Products 
Liability Litigation 
Minnesota’s status as a state that requires the presence of a 
physical injury in seeking the recovery of medical monitoring costs 
was most recently confirmed in In re St. Jude Medical, Inc.117  In St. 
Jude, the defendant manufactured the “Silzone” valve, an artificial 
heart valve.118  After the Food and Drug Administration approved 
the Silzone valve, it was implanted into more than 10,000 people in 
the United States.119  After the valve’s safety was called into 
question, the defendant issued a voluntary recall.120  Shortly 
thereafter, individuals who alleged they had either been harmed by 
the Silzone valve, or who had the valve but did not have symptoms, 
 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id.  Plaintiffs brought statutory claims pursuant to Minnesota Statutes 
sections 325F.67, 325F.68, 325F.69, and  325D.43.  Id. 
 114. See id. at 548. 
 115. Id. at 552. 
 116. Id.  However, for the purposes of ruling on plaintiffs’ class certification 
motion, the court “assumed that medical monitoring [was] a proper theory of 
recovery.”  Id. 
 117. No. MDL 01-1396, 2004 WL 45504 (D. Minn. Jan. 5, 2004). 
 118. Id. at *1. 
 119. St. Jude, 2004 WL 45504, at *1. 
 120. Id. 
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brought a number of lawsuits against St. Jude Medical.121 
The plaintiffs subsequently brought a motion seeking the 
certification of two classes.122  Class I included every patient in the 
United States who at the time of the claim had the Silzone valve 
implanted.123  This class was designated the “monitoring” class, and 
sought injunctive relief in the form of medical monitoring.124  Class 
II consisted of all people in the United States who received a 
Silzone valve and sustained physical injuries due to the valve.125  
This class was designated the “injury” class, and sought damages.126 
On March 27, 2003, the court conditionally certified Classes I 
and II pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.127  The court requested additional briefing on potential 
subclasses because the court anticipated creating subclasses to 
address any substantial differences in state law.128 
The Class I plaintiffs sought to recover the expenses of future 
medical examinations intended to detect the onset of injuries 
arising from the Silzone heart valve.129  To that end, the Class I 
plaintiffs sought a medical monitoring program, paid for through a 
trust account funded by St. Jude Medical, and designed to monitor 
side effects associated with defective valves.130 
After considering the parties’ additional briefing and after 
hearing extensive arguments, the court concluded it would 
continue “to manage the monitoring class as a class action.”131  The 
 
 121. Id.  On April 18, 2001, these cases were consolidated and transferred to 
the U.S. District Court in the State of Minnesota by the Judicial Panel on 
Multidistrict Litigation, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407, for consolidated pretrial 
proceedings.  Id. 
 122. St. Jude, 2004 WL 45504, at *1. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id.  Specifically, referring to FED. R. CIV. P. 23, the court found that both 
Class I and II met the threshold requirements set forth in Rule 23(a), that 
common issues of law and fact predominated, and that a class action was the best 
way to adjudicate the claims.  Id.  As a result, the court conditionally certified the 
claims under Rules 23(b)(3) and (c)(4), and conditionally certified the medical 
monitoring claims of Class I under Rule 23(b)(2).  Id. 
 128. Id. at *2. 
 129. Id. at *4. 
 130. Id.  Plaintiffs also desired the program to include an epidemiological 
component “to collect data and study the effects of the Silzone valves.”  Id. 
 131. Id.  The court justified its decision, arguing that monitoring claims are 
typically smaller in value than personal injury claims, “and are closer to the 
‘negative value’ lawsuits that class actions were intended to encompass.”  Id.  Other 
17
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court did recognize, however, that it must predict how each state 
would address medical monitoring claims, and that a “consequence 
of this sub-classing is that class members who are asymptomatic and 
whose claims arise in jurisdictions that require injury for a tort 
action to proceed will have to be excluded from the class 
entirely.”132  Despite this fact, the court determined that the 
differences in state laws of those states recognizing medical 
monitoring as a stand-alone claim did not undermine the medical 
monitoring class.133 
In evaluating the status of medical monitoring law in each 
state, “the Court recognize[d] . . . that medical monitoring law is 
not a well-established cause of action.”134  Further, the court stated 
that because Minnesota is a state that recognizes medical 
monitoring but imposes an “injury” requirement, the individuals 
whose valves were implanted in Minnesota were not to be included 
in Class I.135 
Six months later, however, the court changed its mind.  In a 
 
commentators have similarly described the role of class actions in mass tort cases 
as a “vehicle” for small value claimants to combine their claims so as to ensure that 
bringing such claims is economically feasible.  See John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: 
The Dilemma of Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1350 (1995).  The 
court did, however, note “that some courts have been reluctant to certify medical 
monitoring classes,” especially those “involving exposure to environmental toxins 
and over-the-counter drugs.”  St. Jude, 2004 WL 45504, at *4.  The court 
contended, however, that “[t]he rationale for such hesitancy” was “not applicable” 
in this case, because “[u]nlike claims involving uncertain levels of exposure and an 
uncertain number of potential individuals exposed,” here “the medical 
monitoring class [was] certain and discrete.”  Id.  The court also justified its 
decision by noting that here the court would “not face issues of length or amount 
of exposure” as it does in “cases involving environmental toxins.”  Id.  Finally, the 
court stated that because it restricted the class “to include only asymptomatic 
individuals,” the case did “not present issues of causation.”  Id. 
 132. St. Jude, 2004 WL 45504, at *5 (citing In re Diet Drugs Prod. Liab. Litig., 
Civ. No. A-98-20626, 1999 WL 673066, at *16 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 26, 1999)). 
 133. Id.  This was because the states that do recognize medical monitoring as 
an independent cause of action have elements that appear to be similar.  Id. 
(citing In re Baycol Prod. Litig., 218 F.R.D. 197 (D. Minn. Sept. 17, 2003)).  In 
Baycol, the court decided against certifying a medical monitoring class because the 
class representatives had previously received the requested testing and monitoring.  
In re Baycol Prod. Litig., 218 F.R.D. at 211.  In addition, the class representatives 
had suffered injury, and thus the Baycol court was concerned the representatives 
would not “adequately represent the interests of the uninjured class members.”  
Id.; see also In re Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 172 F.R.D. 271, 287 (S.D. Ohio 
1997) (certifying medical monitoring class and noting the only relevant variation 
in state law is whether an injury is required). 
 134. St. Jude, 2004 WL 45504, at *6. 
 135. Id. at *8-9. 
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separate proceeding of In re St. Jude Medical, Inc., the plaintiffs 
argued that individuals with a Silzone valve did have present 
physical injuries in the form of subcellular injuries.136  Thus, such 
individuals met the injury requirement in jurisdictions that did not 
allow medical monitoring absent present physical injury.137  The 
court decided to include states in the class, as a separate subclass, 
only if they had previously recognized subcellular damage as a 
present injury.138  Despite the fact that no Minnesota case has 
expressly held that subcellular damage constitutes a present 
physical injury, the court added individuals whose valves were 
implanted in Minnesota.139 
St. Jude Medical appealed the district court’s decision to the 
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.140  St. Jude Medical argued that 
the district court erred by certifying the medical monitoring class, 
in part, because of the “diverse legal and factual issues” present.141  
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed, and reversed the 
district court’s certification of the medical monitoring class.142  
Following the lead of other courts around the country, the Eighth 
Circuit Court of Appeals explained that the number of individual 
issues present in the medical monitoring class and the highly 
individualized nature of each plaintiff’s need for medical 
monitoring made class certification improper.143 
 
 136. No. 01-1396, 2004 WL 1630786 (D. Minn. July 15, 2005). 
 137. Id. at *4. 
 138. Id. at *4-5. 
 139. Id. at *5.  The court stated that its decision to add Minnesota to the class 
was based on the Minnesota Court of Appeals decision in Bryson “that allegations 
of chromosome damage presented a fact question for the jury on whether an 
individual was ‘injured.’”  Id.  The court also decided to include the plaintiffs 
whose valves were installed in Delaware “based on the Court’s revised analysis of 
the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Mergenthaler v. Asbestos Corp., 480 A.2d 
647, 651 (Del. 1984).”  Id.  In addition, the court included the plaintiffs whose 
valves were implanted in Ohio based on Verbryke v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 
616 N.E.2d 1162 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992).  Id.  The remaining states originally 
excluded by the court because they required a present physical injury were not 
added to the class because those jurisdictions had not previously recognized that 
subcellular damage may constitute an “injury.”  Id. 
 140. In re St. Jude Medical Inc., 425 F.3d 1116 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 141. Id. at 1121. 
 142. Id. at 1122-23. 
 143. Id. at 1122.  For example, considerations such as a plaintiff’s medical 
history, condition of heart valves at the time of implantation, risk factors, general 
health, and personal choice, all beg an individualized inquiry.  Id. 
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IV.  STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY ON THE LAW OF MEDICAL MONITORING 
Currently, courts in at least thirteen states plus the District of 
Columbia and Guam recognize medical monitoring absent present 
physical injury.  Further, courts in sixteen states plus the Virgin 
Islands appear to allow medical monitoring only if the plaintiffs can 
show present physical injury.  The remaining jurisdictions either 
have not articulated a test or have not addressed the issue of 
medical monitoring.  The tables below categorize the states based 
on the present physical injury requirement (or lack thereof).  It is 
important to note that some states permit a cause of action for 
medical monitoring, while other states only allow medical 
monitoring as a remedy for an existing common law or statutory 
tort.  See the Appendix in Part IX for a short summary of the 
relevant authority for each state. 
A. States That Allow Medical Monitoring in the Absence of Present 
Physical Injury 
State Authority 
Arizona Burns v. Jaquays Mining Corp., 752 P.2d 28 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) 
California Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 
795 (Cal. 1993) 
Colorado Cook v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 755 F. Supp. 1468 
(D. Colo. 1991) 




Friends for All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed 
Aircraft Corp., 746 F.2d 816 (D.C. Cir. 1984)144 
Florida Petito v. A.H. Robins Co., 750 So. 2d 103 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1999) 
Guam Abuan v. Gen. Elec. Co., 3 F.3d 329 (9th Cir. 
1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1116 (1994) 
Illinois Lewis v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 793 N.E.2d 869 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 2003) 
Montana Lamping v. Am. Home Prods., Inc., No. DV-97-
85786 (Mont. 4th Dist. Ct. Feb. 2, 2000) 
New Jersey Ayers v. Twp. of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287 (N.J. 
1987) 
 
 144. See also supra Part II.A. 
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New York Patton v. Gen. Signal Corp., 984 F. Supp. 666 
(W.D.N.Y. 1997) 
Ohio Day v. NLO, 851 F. Supp. 869 (S.D. Ohio 1994) 
Pennsylvania Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v. Dep’t of the Army, 
696 A.2d 137 (Pa. 1997) 
Utah Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply, 858 P.2d 970 
(Utah 1993) 
West Virginia Bower v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 522 S.E.2d 
424 (W. Va. 1999)145 
B. States That Do Not Allow Medical Monitoring Absent a Present 
Physical Injury 
State Authority 
Alabama Hinton ex rel. Hinton v. Monsanto Co., 813 So. 
2d 827 (Ala. 2001) 
Delaware Mergenthaler v. Asbestos Corp., 480 A.2d 647 
(Del. 1984) 
Indiana Baker v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 70 F.3d 951 
(7th Cir. 1995) 
Kansas Burton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 884 F. 
Supp. 1515 (D. Kan. 1995) 
Kentucky Wood v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., 82 S.W.3d 849 (Ky. 
2002) 
Louisiana LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315 (West Supp. 2004) 
Michigan Henry v. Dow Chem. Co., 701 N.W.2d 684 
(Mich. 2005) 
Minnesota Bryson v. Pillsbury Co., 573 N.W.2d 718 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 1998)146 
Missouri Thomas v. FAG Bearings Corp., 846 F. Supp. 
1400 (W.D. Mo. 1994) 
Nebraska Trimble v. Asarco, Inc., 232 F.3d 946 (8th Cir. 
2000), abrogated on procedural grounds by Exxon 
Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs. Inc., 125 S. Ct. 
2611 (2005) 




 145. See also supra Part II.C. 
 146. See also supra Part III. 
21
Aberson: A Fifty-state Survey of Medical Monitoring and the Approach the M
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2006
13ABERSON.DOC 4/5/2006  1:35:02 PM 
1116 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:3 
North Carolina Carroll v. Litton Sys., Inc., No. B-C-88-253, 1990 
WL 312969 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 29, 1990) 
South Carolina Rosmer v. Pfizer, Inc., No. CIV.A. 9:99-2280-




Norwood v. Raytheon Co., No. EP-04-CA-127-
PRM, 2006 WL 267335 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 17, 
2006) 
Virginia Ball v. Joy Techs., Inc., 958 F.2d 36 (4th Cir. 
1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1033 (1992) 
Virgin Islands Purjet v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp., Civ. No. 
1985/284, 1986 WL 1200 (V.I. Jan. 8, 1996) 
Washington Duncan v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 203 F.R.D. 601 
(W.D. Wash. 2001) 
C. States That Have Either Not Addressed the Issue of Medical 
Monitoring or Have Not Articulated a Test 
State Authority 
Arkansas Baker v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs. Div., 992 S.W.2d 
797 (Ark. 1999) 
Maryland Philip Morris Inc. v. Angeletti, 752 A.2d 200 
(Md. 2000) 
Puerto Rico Barreras Ruiz v. Am. Tobacco Co., 180 F.R.D. 
194 (D.P.R. 1998) 
















Medical monitoring issue not addressed 
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V.  POLICY ARGUMENTS FOR ALLOWING MEDICAL MONITORING 
ABSENT PRESENT PHYSICAL INJURY 
In states that allow recovery for medical monitoring without 
demonstrating present physical injury, the substantive question to 
be answered is: “Should courts allow plaintiffs to recover based on 
the possibility of future injuries by imposing on defendants the 
current costs of medically monitoring those persons placed at 
increased risk?”147  A number of courts have answered this question 
affirmatively, setting forth policy arguments in support of their 
decision to allow medical monitoring absent some present physical 
injury. 
In Bower,148 the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals set 
forth four frequently cited public policy considerations, originally 
identified by the California Supreme Court in Potter v. Firestone Tire 
& Rubber Co.,149 that favor the recognition of medical monitoring 
claims absent present physical injury: (1) allowing recovery fosters 
access to medical testing and facilitates early diagnosis and 
treatment,150 (2) recognizing medical monitoring claims deters 
irresponsible distribution of toxic substances, (3) early monitoring 
may prevent future costs and reduce the potential liability of the 
tortfeasor,151 and (4) medical monitoring satisfies basic notions of 
fairness by assuring that wrongfully exposed plaintiffs recover the 
costs of medical treatment. 
Henderson and Twerski152 have briefly addressed this 
analysis.153  They argue that the first and third policy reasons stated 
 
 147. Henderson & Twerski, supra note 6, at 842. 
 148. Bower v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 522 S.E.2d 424, 431 (W. Va. 1999). 
 149. See 863 P.2d 795, 824 (Cal. 1993). 
 150. See also Ayers v. Twp. of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 311 (N.J. 1987) (noting 
that early diagnosis and treatment is especially valuable for cancer patients, where 
delay in diagnosis often increases risks to the patient). 
 151. See also id. at 312 (granting the plaintiffs a monitoring remedy that 
potentially prevents future disease may “reduce the overall costs to the responsible 
parties”). 
 152. Henderson and Twerski are tort scholars and reporters for the American 
Law Institute’s Restatement of Torts, Third: Products Liability. 
 153. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 6, at 842-43. 
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above are the same, because both go to the idea that medical 
monitoring helps prevent disease, which consequently benefits all 
other parties in the chain.154  Further, they contend that the second 
policy rationale offered above “is valid only if one assumes that the 
social costs of any given exposure to asbestos or other toxic 
substance can, in the absence of physical injury, be determined 
fairly and accurately.”155  In addition, the deterrence concern fails 
to consider the fact that in some instances the practices that result 
in a plaintiff’s claim for medical monitoring damages, such as 
distribution or dumping of toxic substances that took place years 
ago, were legal at the time they occurred, and, most importantly, 
have already been terminated by the defendant.  Finally, the Bower 
court’s fourth policy justification “clearly begs the question of why 
justice is necessarily served by allowing, through the back door, 
recoveries that courts will not allow in through the front.”156 
VI.  STRONG ARGUMENTS SUPPORT THE CONCLUSION THAT 
MINNESOTA SHOULD REQUIRE A PRESENT PHYSICAL INJURY TO 
ESTABLISH A CLAIM FOR MEDICAL MONITORING DAMAGES 
As previously discussed, the Minnesota Supreme Court has not 
yet addressed the issue of medical monitoring.  However, both the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals and the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Minnesota have properly determined that a present 
physical injury is required to establish a claim for medical 
monitoring expenses. 
As noted above, some courts and commentators make policy 
arguments in support of the idea that recovery of medical 
monitoring expenses should be allowed absent present physical 
injury.  To be sure, these are solid and persuasive policy 
considerations that deserve legitimate consideration.  On balance, 
however, the policy concerns for denying medical monitoring 
 
 154. Id. at 843 n.172. 
 155. Id. at 843.  In addition, other commentators have noted that “[f]orcing 
defendants to internalize unmatured risk in the nature of medical monitoring 
expenses . . . raises serious concerns of overdeterrence.”  Andrew R. Klein, 
Rethinking Medical Monitoring, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 27 (1998); see, e.g., Martin & 
Martin, supra note 6, at 142-43 (“[C]reating a new cause of action for medical 
monitoring that eliminates one of the traditional elements of tort actions does not 
seem warranted.  Its deterrent value is negligible; its compensatory function 
should be rendered moot by changes in the health care system; and the costs of 
subsequent litigation will exceed the benefits obtained.”). 
 156. Henderson & Twerski, supra note 6, at 843. 
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absent present physical injury clearly outweigh any opposing 
concerns.  Thus, when faced with the issue, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court should require a present physical injury to establish 
a claim for medical monitoring damages.    
This standard strikes the appropriate balance between 
competing policy concerns because it still provides the ability to 
seek compensation for medical monitoring expenses to plaintiffs 
who suffer an actual, present physical injury from exposure to 
toxins.  Moreover, the position that the Supreme Court of 
Minnesota should reject medical monitoring in the absence of 
present physical injury is a position supported by both the United 
States Supreme Court (under FELA) and a growing number of 
commentators for some of the reasons highlighted below. 
A.  Courts Encounter Administrative Problems in Medical Monitoring 
Cases 
The process of actually distributing potentially millions of 
dollars in medical monitoring awards is one at which courts are not 
well equipped.  Monitoring funds to be used by large numbers of 
people require court administration and do not guarantee that 
potential victims actually receive testing.157  Moreover, lump-sum 
awards might not actually be used for medical costs.158 
Complicating the court’s distribution of funds is the fact that 
“most monitoring systems established to accomplish marginal 
improvements would duplicate systems set up for similar 
purposes.”159  For example, many monitoring recipients may have 
some form of health insurance that will cover the costs of 
 
 157. Id. at 844. 
 158. Id.; see also Klein, supra note 155, at 24 (“[F]ew (if any) medical 
monitoring proponents suggest that courts award lump-sum damages to plaintiffs, 
presumably because they fear that plaintiffs will spend the money on goods and 
services other than medical surveillance.”); Arvin Maskin et. al., Medical Monitoring: 
A Viable Remedy for Deserving Plaintiffs or Tort Law’s Most Expensive Consolation Prize?, 
27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 521, 541-42 (2000) (describing relevant data on 
plaintiffs’ use of medical monitoring awards).  As a result, some ask that recoveries 
for monitoring expenses go to fund court-administered programs as opposed to 
being paid directly to plaintiffs.  See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 6, at 844; see 
also Maskin et al., supra, at 543 (advocating limiting recovery to a medical fund); 
Amy B. Blumenberg, Note, Medical Monitoring Funds: The Periodic Payment of Future 
Medical Surveillance Expenses in Toxic Exposure Litigation, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 661, 665-66 
(1992) (explaining the periodic payment approach to dispersing medical 
monitoring funds). 
 159. Henderson & Twerski, supra note 6, at 844. 
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monitoring.160 
Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court noted in Metro-North 
additional impediments to a court’s decision to allow recovery of 
the costs of medical monitoring, including (1) medical 
professionals offer conflicting recommendations concerning which 
treatments may be necessary, (2) individual plaintiffs’ unique 
medical needs make pinpointing the reason for additional 
monitoring difficult, and (3) medical surveillance is prudent for a 
number of individuals even absent exposure to toxins.161 
B.  Medical Monitoring Misuses the Resources of Defendants, the Courts, 
and the Health Care System 
Even though many defendants in medical monitoring actions 
tend to be large businesses or government agencies, such 
defendants “do not have an endless supply of financial 
resources.”162  Thus, the natural result of such defendants having to 
shell out large amounts of money to satisfy medical monitoring 
judgments is that future victims who can demonstrate actual 
injuries that require immediate medical attention may not be fully 
compensated.163 
In addition, courts allowing monitoring claims absent present 
physical injury will not have the resources or time necessary to deal 
with large volumes of such claims.164  This problem is exacerbated 
by the fact that those jurisdictions that have recognized monitoring 
claims absent present physical injury have not reached uniformity 
regarding what elements and prerequisites are necessary to prove a 
 
 160. Id.; see also infra Part VII.A. 
 161. 521 U.S. 424, 441-42 (1997). 
 162. Wood v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., 82 S.W.3d 849, 857 (Ky. 2002); see also Henry 
v. Dow Chem. Co., 701 N.W.2d 684, 696-97 (Mich. 2005) (“[J]udicial recognition 
of a medical monitoring cause of action may do more harm than good . . . for 
Michigan’s economy . . . .[There is] no assurance that a decision in plaintiffs’ favor 
. . . will not wreak enormous harm on Michigan’s citizens and its economy.”); 
Henderson & Twerski, supra note 6, at 844-45 (“[T]he serious negative impacts of 
[medical monitoring] liability on the business firms involved cannot be doubted 
. . . .  [D]efendants in these medical monitoring cases face potentially crushing 
liabilities.”). 
 163. Wood, 82 S.W.3d at 857. 
 164. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 6, at 846 (predicting that the West 
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in Bower brought upon the state a volume of 
litigation “with which it is institutionally incapable of dealing” and where the 
“institutional costs to the courts in that state will [likely] be very great”). 
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monitoring claim.165 
Moreover, medical monitoring potentially wastes scarce 
resources and clogs an already congested health care system, all the 
while placing those being monitored at risk of surveillance-related 
harm.166 
C.  Medical Monitoring Absent Present Physical Injury Is Too Far-
Reaching and Could Create a Potentially Limitless Pool of Plaintiffs and 
Result in an Avalanche of Litigation 
The U.S. Supreme Court in Metro-North stated: 
[T]ens of millions of individuals may have suffered 
exposure to substances that might justify some form of 
substance-exposure-related medical monitoring . . . [a]nd 
that fact, along with uncertainty as to the amount of 
liability, could threaten both a “flood” of less important 
cases (potentially absorbing resources better left available 
to those more seriously harmed) and the systemic harms 
that can accompany “unlimited and unpredictable 
liability.”167 
Henderson and Twerski similarly wrote: “Given that 
negligently distributed or discharged toxins can be perceived to lie 
around every corner in the modern industrialized world, and their 
effects on risk levels are at best speculative, the potential tort claims 
involved are inherently limitless and endless.”168 
 
 165. See Wood, 82 S.W.3d at 858. 
 166. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 6, at 844 (“[S]uch monitoring—
especially excessive monitoring––is not only wasteful of scarce resources, but often 
places those being monitored at risk of surveillance-related harm.”); see also Henry, 
701 N.W.2d at 694-95 (“Litigation of these preinjury claims could drain resources 
needed to compensate those with manifest physical injuries and a more immediate 
need for medical care . . . .  It is less than obvious . . . that the benefits of a medical 
monitoring cause of action would outweigh the burdens imposed on plaintiffs with 
manifest injuries, our judicial system, and those responsible for administering and 
financing medical care.”).  See generally George W.C. McCarter, Medical Sue-
Veillance: A History and Critique of the Medical Monitoring Remedy in Toxic Tort 
Litigation, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 227, 276-80 (1993). 
 167. 521 U.S. 424, 442 (1997); see also Henderson & Twerski, supra note 6, at 
845 (“If the past decade of asbestos litigation has taught us anything, it is that the 
appetites of the plaintiff’s bar know no limits in the ongoing search for secondary 
and even tertiary generations of defendants against whom to bring massive 
collective actions on new and expanding legal theories.”). 
 168. Henderson & Twerski, supra note 6, at 844; see also Schwartz et al., supra 
note 4, at 1072 (noting that people are exposed daily to health hazards “through 
the air they breathe, water they drink, food and drugs they ingest, and on the land 
on which they live”). 
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This was the situation that developed in West Virginia after the 
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals recognized in Bower a 
cause of action for medical monitoring absent present physical 
injury.  A short time after the Bower decision, a class action was filed 
against major cigarette manufacturers on behalf of 270,000 present 
and former West Virginia smokers who had not been diagnosed 
with any smoking-related diseases, but were seeking the creation 
and funding by the defendants of a medical monitoring program 
for the early detection of tobacco-related diseases.169  In another 
medical monitoring class action filed in West Virginia, 
asymptomatic coal preparation plant workers from seven states 
brought a claim against the suppliers of acrylamide, seeking 
medical monitoring for the plaintiffs’ alleged exposure to the 
chemical.170  Finally, in Carter v. Monsanto Co., a landowner filed a 
class action, seeking to recover the cost of inspecting and 
monitoring his property for dioxin that had allegedly leaked from 
landfills.171  These three cases help illustrate the flood of litigation 
and difficult line-drawing that has accompanied West Virginia’s 
decision to allow medical monitoring absent present physical 
injury.172 
D.  Allowing Plaintiffs to Seek Medical Monitoring Damages Absent 
Present Physical Injury Will Potentially Preclude such Plaintiffs’ Later 
Claims when Injury Actually Develops 
Under the doctrine of res judicata (or claim preclusion) a 
judgment on the merits in a prior suit involving the same parties or 
their privies bars a subsequent suit based upon the same cause of 
 
 169. In re Tobacco Litigation (Medical Monitoring Cases), 600 S.E.2d 188, 190-
91 (W. Va. 2004). 
 170. Stern v. Chemtall, Inc., 617 S.E.2d 876, 879-80 (W. Va. 2005).  The 
broadly defined class included coal preparation plant workers in West Virginia, 
Virginia, Illinois, Indiana, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Tennessee.  Id. at 880. 
 171. 575 S.E.2d 342, 344 (W. Va. 2002).  The West Virginia Supreme Court of 
Appeals declined to create a new cause of action for “property monitoring,” 
stating that “[n]either West Virginia common law nor West Virginia statutory law 
presently supports or recognizes a claim for property monitoring.”  Id. at 346. 
 172. See also Henry v. Dow Chem. Co., 701 N.W.2d 684, 696 n.15 (“[E]ven if we 
were to create a medical monitoring cause of action, in light of both the essentially 
limitless number of such exposures and the limited resource pool from which 
such exposures can be compensated, a ‘cutoff’ line would still inevitably need to 
be drawn.”); Henderson & Twerski, supra note 6, at 845 (noting that the Bower 
criteria “will not prevent most well-prepared cases from reaching triers of fact”). 
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action.173  For example, in a medical monitoring action where the 
plaintiff has been exposed to a toxic substance but has not suffered 
present physical injury, such a plaintiff may be awarded a sum of 
money commensurate with the costs of future medical 
surveillance.174  If the same plaintiff were to later develop an injury 
as a result of the earlier exposure, that plaintiff may be precluded 
from bringing the same claim for additional damages.175  Thus, a 
court’s failure to recognize a cause of action for medical 
monitoring in the absence of a present physical injury could be 
considered a “safeguard that benefits victims.”176 
VII. THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT SHOULD LEAVE THE ISSUE OF 
MEDICAL MONITORING TO THE LEGISLATURE  
Another argument against the position that courts should 
allow recovery for medical monitoring absent present physical 
injury is that the authorization for such a remedy should come 
from the various state legislatures rather than as a judicially created 
remedy.177  This section is not intended to suggest that the 
Minnesota Supreme Court is never capable of creating common 
law causes of action or remedies.178  In fact, there are a number of 
instances where courts should further the law’s development by 
adopting new common law claims and remedies independent of 
legislative action where public policy so demands.  Nonetheless, 
this section argues that because of the extraordinary considerations 
involved with the medical monitoring issue in particular, the 
legislature is better equipped than courts to deal appropriately with 
the issue. 
 
 173. See Wood v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., 82 S.W.3d 849, 858 (Ky. 2002) (citing City 
of Louisville v. Louisville Prof’l Firefighters Ass’n, 813 S.W.2d 804, 806 (Ky. 1991)). 
 174. See id. 
 175. See id.; see also Schwartz et al., supra note 4, at 1079 (“[A] medical 
monitoring award could preclude plaintiffs from seeking additional damages if 
and when they actually develop a disease or injury.”). 
 176. Wood, 82 S.W.3d at 858. 
 177. See Schwartz et al., supra note 4, at 1071. 
 178. See Tereault v. Palmer, 413 N.W.2d 283, 286 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) 
(“[T]he task of extending existing law falls to the supreme court or the 
legislature.”). 
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A.  The Large Number of Questions Associated with the Award of 
Monitoring Expenses Favors Legislative Consideration 
There are a number of convincing reasons why courts should 
avoid assuming the role of lawmakers with regard to medical 
monitoring.179  First, legislatures are in a better position than courts 
to acquire all of the relevant information in making such a 
complex and sweeping change to traditional tort law.180  
Legislatures have more access to information and resources than 
the courts, and are in a better position than the courts to weigh the 
previously discussed social costs and benefits of monitoring 
programs.181  Moreover, because tort law has traditionally 
developed “in a slow, incremental fashion,” the recognition of such 
a novel theory “warrants legislative consideration.”182 
Second, a legislature’s prospective treatment of medical 
monitoring awards would provide fair notice to potential 
tortfeasors.183  That is, because a court’s ruling occurs on a 
retroactive basis, the public is broad-sided when its potential legal 
obligations are changed for actions committed sometimes years 
before the ruling.184  Thus, changing existing law in a prospective 
manner through the legislative process would provide “fair notice” 
to those potentially affected, and allow current offenders to change 
their behavior.185 
In addition, the complexity involved in determining whether 
monitoring payments are to be paid pursuant to a court-created 
fund or by lump-sum payment favor legislative control.186  This 
justification is especially important given the pervasive abuse of 
 
 179. See Schwartz et al., supra note 4, at 1071-81. 
 180. Id. at 1071. 
 181. Id. at 1072-73. 
 182. Id. at 1073-74 (noting that judicial changes to longstanding common law 
rules “such as the development of strict products liability in tort, the removal of 
the privity barrier, . . . the evolution from contributory negligence to comparative 
fault, . . . the modification of traditional immunities, permitting recovery for a 
child who had been injured in the womb, and the modification of the assumption 
of risk defense” have occurred gradually over a number of years). 
 183. Id. at 1075. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id.; see also BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 (1996) (stating 
on the subject of punitive damages that “[e]lementary notions of fairness 
enshrined in our constitutional jurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair 
notice . . . of the conduct that will subject him to [liability]”). 
 186. Schwartz et al., supra note 4, at 1077. 
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lump-sum monitoring awards.187 
Finally, monitoring claims involving collateral compensation 
demand careful consideration from the legislature.188  Under the 
“collateral source rule,” benefits received by a plaintiff from a 
variety of sources including “health or medical insurance, disability 
insurance, workers’ compensation benefits, and . . . government 
benefits, are . . . deemed ‘collateral’ to the tortfeasor” and are thus 
not deducted when calculating plaintiff’s award under a 
monitoring claim.189  As a result, third-party payment plans may 
overlap with an award of monitoring expenses further complicating 
the process.190 
B. Several Courts Favor Legislative Consideration of Medical Monitoring 
A number of courts have similarly expressed concern over a 
judicially created remedy for medical monitoring, instead favoring 
a legislative approach.  For example, in Badillo v. American Brands, 
Inc., the Supreme Court of Nevada, addressing the issue of medical 
monitoring, stated: “Altering common law rights, creating new 
causes of action, and providing new remedies for wrongs is 
generally a legislative, not a judicial, function.”191  Similarly, in 
Carroll, the court noted: “If a North Carolina court were faced with 
the question of whether to create a tort . . . for medical monitoring 
costs . . . it would decline to create such a tort [and] [i]nstead it 
would look to the legislature for guidance.”192  The U.S. District 
Court for the Western District of Washington stated in Duncan that 
“[t]he Washington Supreme Court has traditionally deferred to the 
state legislature for the creation of new causes of action,” and 
“[t]he legislature has a ‘greater ability to fully explore the spectrum 
of competing societal interests,’ while the judiciary ‘is the least 
capable of receiving public input and resolving broad public policy 
questions based on societal consensus.’”193 
Most recently, the Michigan Supreme Court in Henry v. Dow 
 
 187. Id. at 1077-78. 
 188. Id. at 1078. 
 189. Id.; see also John G. Fleming, The Collateral Source Rule and Loss Allocation in 
Tort Law, 54 CAL. L. REV. 1478, 1478 (1966). 
 190. Schwartz et al., supra note 4, at 1078. 
 191. 16 P.3d 435, 440 (Nev. 2001). 
 192. Carroll v. Litton Sys., Inc., No. B-C-88-253, 1990 WL 312969, at *51 
(W.D.N.C. Oct. 29, 1990). 
 193. Duncan v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 203 F.R.D. 601, 605-06 (W.D. Wash. 2001) 
(internal citation omitted). 
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Chemical Co. declined to recognize a medical monitoring claim 
absent present physical injury.194  The court decided instead to 
defer to the state legislature, who in the court’s opinion was “better 
suited to undertake the complex task of balancing the competing 
societal interests at stake.”195 
The court in Henry proffered additional reasons for its 
preference that the legislature address medical monitoring.  First, 
the court noted that the principle of separation of powers bars 
policy-making by the court.196  In addition, the court was concerned 
with how to determine whether the plaintiffs would be eligible to 
participate in a particular monitoring program.197  The court stated 
that “[s]uch a determination involves the consideration of a 
number of practical questions and the balancing of a host of 
competing interests—a task more appropriate for the legislative 
branch than the judiciary.”198  The court was also concerned with 
the subsequent administration of such programs.199  The court 
 
 194. 701 N.W.2d 684, 685-86 (Mich. 2005) (involving residents allegedly 
exposed to dioxin discharged by a nearby chemical plant). 
 195. Id. at 686.  The court stated that “[i]n reality, plaintiffs propose a 
transformation in tort law that will require the courts of this state—in this case and 
the thousands that would inevitably follow—to make decisions that are more 
characteristic of those made in the legislative, executive, and administrative 
processes.”  Id. at 692. 
 196. Id. at 697. 
 197. Id. at 698.  Some of the questions facing courts when determining an 
individual’s eligibility for a medical monitoring program include: 
How old does the applicant have to be?  How long must an applicant 
have lived in the affected area?  Where, exactly, is the “affected area”?  
Must the applicant have measurable levels of dioxin in the bloodstream 
to qualify?  If so, what is the threshold level of dioxin an applicant must 
have for eligibility? 
Id. at 698 n.22.  
 198. Id. at 698. 
 199. Id. at 698-99.  Some of the questions courts need to consider in 
administering a medical monitoring program include:  
How would claims be filed?  How would claims be processed?  Who 
would do the processing-court staff or a private contract firm?  Would a 
claimant be free to receive testing from any medical facility he chooses, 
or would a claimant’s choice of testing facility be limited?  To keep down 
costs of the program, could defendant be permitted to establish a 
“preferred provider network” of medical professionals such that 
claimants could only be tested within the network?  In the absence of 
such a network, would claimants be limited to the usual and necessary 
costs for such services, or is the sky the limit?  How would the system 
reconcile two different physicians’ opinions of what is “reasonable” in 
terms of medical testing?  Would there be a grievance procedure?  Would 
defendant be billed directly, or would it periodically pay into a fund?   
32
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 3 [2006], Art. 14
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol32/iss3/14
13ABERSON.DOC 4/5/2006  1:35:02 PM 
2006] FIFTY-STATE SURVEY OF MEDICAL MONITORING 1127 
noted that the operation of a monitoring program would “impose 
huge clerical burdens on a court system lacking the resources to 
effectively administer such a regime” and that the courts do not 
“possess the technical expertise necessary to effectively administer a 
program heavily dependent on scientific disciplines such as 
medicine, chemistry, and environmental science.”200  As a result of 
these concerns, the court concluded that “[t]he court system . . . is 
simply not institutionally equipped to establish, promulgate 
operative rules for, or administer such a program.”201 
C.  Louisiana Serves as a Successful Model for Legislative Consideration 
of Medical Monitoring 
Louisiana’s consideration of medical monitoring demonstrates 
that state legislatures are capable of making the complex policy 
decisions associated with the issue.  In Bourgeois v. A.P. Green 
Industries, Inc., past and current shipyard employees, who alleged 
that they were exposed to asbestos, brought a class action suit 
against manufacturers, sellers, and suppliers of asbestos used at the 
shipyards.202  The plaintiffs sought medical monitoring to detect 
potential diseases, and the establishment of a judicially 
administered fund for the medical monitoring.203  The issue before 
the court was “whether asymptomatic plaintiffs, who have had 
significant occupational exposure to asbestos and must now bear 
the expense of periodic medical examinations to monitor the 
effects of that exposure, have suffered ‘damage’ under Louisiana 
Civil Code article 2315.”204  The applicable statute provided that 
“[e]very act whatever of man that causes damage to another obliges 
him by whose fault it happened to repair it.”205 
Although the Louisiana Supreme Court recognized that 
Louisiana law had not previously allowed the recovery of medical 
expenses “[a]bsent a corresponding physical injury,” the court 
decided to recognize medical monitoring absent present physical 
injury.206  In doing so, the court stated that medical monitoring 
 
Id. at 699 n.23. 
 200. Id. at 699. 
 201. Id. 
 202. 716 So. 2d 355, 356 (La. 1998). 
 203. Id. at 356-57. 
 204. Id. at 357. 
 205. Id. at 357 n.6 (internal citation omitted). 
 206. Id. at 358-59. 
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costs were a “compensable item of damage under Civil Code article 
2315” as long as specific criteria were met.207 
In response to the Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision in 
Bourgeois, the Louisiana legislature amended article 2315 in 1999 to 
supersede the court’s decision.208  Article 2315, which provides for a 
person’s liability for acts causing damages, now excludes the 
following types of damages: “costs for future medical treatment, 
services, surveillance, or procedures of any kind unless such 
treatment, services, surveillance, or procedures are directly related 
to a manifest physical or mental injury or disease.”209  Thus, article 
2315 now excludes recovery for medical monitoring unless present 
physical injury can be shown.210  More importantly, however, article 
2315 displays the ability of state legislatures to evaluate and make 
rational decisions regarding significant and competing policy 
concerns that effect litigation.211 
 
 207. Id. at 360.  The criteria included: 
(1) significant exposure to a proven hazardous substance; (2) as a 
proximate result of this exposure, plaintiff suffers a significantly 
increased risk of contracting a serious latent disease; (3) plaintiff’s risk of 
contracting a serious latent disease is greater than (a) the risk of 
contracting the same disease had he or she not been exposed and (b) the 
chances of members of the public at large of developing the disease; (4) 
a monitoring procedure exists that makes the early detection of the 
disease possible; (5) the monitoring procedure has been prescribed by a 
qualified physician and is reasonably necessary according to 
contemporary scientific principles; (6) the prescribed monitoring regime 
is different from that normally recommended in the absence of 
exposure; and (7) there is some demonstrated clinical value in the early 
detection and diagnosis of the disease. 
Id. at 360-61. 
 208. Act of July 9, 1999, H.B. 1784, 1999 L.A. Legis 989 (1999) (revising article 
2315); see also James E. Lapeze, Implications of Amending Civil Code Article 2315 on 
Toxic Torts in Louisiana, 60 LA. L. REV. 833, 833 (2000) (“The revision seems clearly 
aimed at eliminating medical monitoring as a viable element of damages 
recoverable in Louisiana.”). 
 209. Lapeze, supra note 208, at 841.  The Louisiana Court of Appeals noted 
that despite the Legislature’s intent that the amendment have retroactive effect, 
the Louisiana Supreme Court has held that the amendment cannot be applied 
retroactively so as to violate a person’s due process rights by divesting such person 
of vested rights.  Motorola, Inc. v. Associated Indem. Corp., 878 So. 2d 824, 833-34 
(La. Ct. App. 2004). 
 210. See Lapeze, supra note 208, at 842 (citing article 2315 and noting that the 
amended language “seems to be referring to a pure medical monitoring recovery, 
one that does not include any actual injury . . . barring medical monitoring as a 
separate theory of recovery in the absence of manifest physical or mental injury”). 
 211. See also Maskin et al., supra 158, at 548 (stating that article 2315 is an 
example “of a swift, clear legislative response to curb the scope of the medical 
monitoring remedy, in an attempt to compensate only those with truly meritorious 
34
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 3 [2006], Art. 14
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol32/iss3/14
13ABERSON.DOC 4/5/2006  1:35:02 PM 
2006] FIFTY-STATE SURVEY OF MEDICAL MONITORING 1129 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Recognition of medical monitoring absent present physical 
injury represents a sweeping change to tort law.  Given the 
increasingly litigious nature of society, coupled with public hysteria 
concerning exposure to toxic contaminants, it is fair to say that 
future courts will be confronted with the medical monitoring issue 
on a number of occasions. 
When faced with the issue, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
should require that plaintiffs show an actual, present physical injury 
prior to recovery.  This is the approach supported by the United 
States Supreme Court in Metro-North212 and by a growing number of 
states.213  It is also the best approach given the significant policy 
concerns present in permitting recovery absent present physical 
injury.  Finally, this standard still allows plaintiffs who have 
developed a present and manifest illness or disease as a result of 
exposure to toxins the ability to seek recovery for the costs of 
monitoring. 
That having been said, because of the complex policy 
considerations and the balancing of societal interests inherently 
present in evaluating the medical monitoring issue, the ideal 
scenario is for Minnesota courts to delay a judicially fashioned 
remedy for medical monitoring pending consideration of the issue 
by the Minnesota legislature. 
IX.  STATE SURVEY APPENDIX OF CASE LAW 
The following appendix contains a brief summary of the case 
law noted in the tables found in Part IV.A-C. 
Alabama 
In Hinton, the plaintiff brought a claim against a chemical 
company alleging that he was exposed to polychlorinated biphenyls 
(PCBs) when the company released chemicals into the 
environment.214  The plaintiff sought to recover the costs of medical 
monitoring.215  In answering the question certified216 by the U.S. 
 
claims”). 
 212. See supra Part II.B. 
 213. See supra Part IV. 
 214. Hinton ex rel. Hinton v. Monsanto Co., 813 So. 2d 827, 828 (Ala. 2001). 
 215. Id. 
 216. The U.S. District Court certified the following question: “Does a 
complaint which does not allege any past or present personal injury to the plaintiff 
state a cause of action for medical monitoring and study when the plaintiff alleges 
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District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, the Supreme 
Court of Alabama stated that Alabama law does not recognize a 
cause of action for medical monitoring absent a manifest physical 
injury or illness.217 
Arizona 
In Burns, residents of a trailer park located adjacent to an 
asbestos-producing mill brought suit, seeking damages for personal 
injuries and property damage.218  The plaintiffs also sought 
damages for medical surveillance to monitor any potential 
development of asbestos-related diseases.219  The Arizona Court of 
Appeals held that “despite the absence of physical manifestation of 
any asbestos-related diseases . . . plaintiffs should be entitled to . . . 
regular medical testing and evaluation.”220 
Arkansas 
In Baker, the Supreme Court of Arkansas noted that although 
“[t]he complaint originally contained a cause of action for medical 
monitoring . . . the plaintiffs agreed to treat medical monitoring as 
a type of damages instead of a separate cause of action.”221  The 
court did not elaborate, however, on whether Arkansas law requires 
a plaintiff to show present physical injury to seek out such a 
remedy. 
California 
In Potter, the plaintiff landowners brought a claim against a tire 
manufacturer that disposed of its toxic waste at a nearby landfill.222  
The plaintiffs alleged that as a result of the defendant’s practices, 
they experienced prolonged exposure to carcinogens.223  The 
California Supreme Court concluded that the costs of medical 
monitoring were a compensable item of damages when “liability is 
 
that he has been exposed to hazardous contamination and pollution by the 
conduct of the defendant?”  Id. 
 217. Id. at 832; see also S. Bakeries, Inc. v. Knipp, 852 So. 2d 712, 717-19 (Ala. 
2002) (reaffirming in an asbestos exposure case that Alabama does not recognize 
a cause of action for medical monitoring absent a present physical injury). 
 218. Burns v. Jaquays Mining Corp., 752 P.2d 28, 29-30 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987). 
 219. Id. at 30. 
 220. Id. at 33.  The court also held that the money for medical monitoring 
should be allocated through a fund administered by the court, as opposed to a 
lump sum payment.  Id. at 34.   
 221. Baker v. Wyeth-Ayerst Lab. Div., 992 S.W.2d 797, 799 n.2 (Ark. 1999) 
(involving plaintiffs who had used a weight loss drug that was subsequently 
removed from the market due to its dangerousness). 
 222. Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 801 (Cal. 1993). 
 223. Id. 
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established under traditional tort theories of recovery” and where 
the need for medical monitoring is a “reasonably certain 
consequence of a plaintiff’s toxic exposure and that the 
recommended monitoring is reasonable.”224  The court also noted, 
however, that “[r]ecognition that a defendant’s conduct has 
created the need for future medical monitoring does not create a 
new tort.”225 
Colorado 
In Cook, the plaintiffs were landowners who sued the operators 
of a nearby nuclear weapons plant for injuries and damages caused 
by hazardous substances either released or threatened to be 
released.226  The plaintiffs brought a number of claims including 
one for medical monitoring under Colorado common law.227  The 
U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado predicted that the 
Colorado Supreme Court would recognize a claim for medical 
monitoring.228 
Connecticut 
In Martin, the plaintiff landowners brought an action against 
the owner of a neighboring gas station after methyl tertiary-butyl 
ether (MTBE) was found in the groundwater near the gas station.229  
The plaintiffs sought damages in the form of medical 
monitoring.230  In denying the defendant’s motion for summary 
judgment to bar the plaintiffs from pursuing medical monitoring as 
a remedy, the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut 
stated that the “Connecticut Supreme Court has cited favorably a 
Third Circuit case that allowed medical monitoring in the absence 
of present injury.”231 
 
 224. Id. at 824. 
 225. Id. at 823; see also Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Superior Court, 63 P.3d 913 
(Cal. 2003) (reaffirming that medical monitoring is not a separate cause of action 
under California law). 
 226. Cook v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 755 F. Supp.  2d 1468, 1471 (D. Colo. 1991). 
 227. Id. at 1476. 
 228. Id. at 1477.  The court also predicted that the Colorado Supreme Court 
would not, on the other hand, likely recognize a claim for “generalized scientific 
studies” to be paid by defendant.  Id. at 1478. 
 229. Martin v. Shell Oil Co., 180 F. Supp. 2d 313, 316 (D. Conn. 2002). 
 230. Id. at 322. 
 231. Id. at 323; see also Doe v. City of Stamford, 699 A.2d 52 (Conn. 1997) 
(citing In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1990) favorably yet 
proceeding instead to analyze the facts under a state workers’ compensation law). 
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Delaware 
In Mergenthaler, the plaintiffs, former asbestos workers and 
their spouses, brought claims against employers and others based 
on occupational exposure to asbestos during the course of their 
employment.232  Specifically, the workers’ wives brought an action 
seeking recovery of medical surveillance expenses as a result of 
potentially coming into contact with asbestos while washing their 
husbands’ work clothes.233  The Supreme Court of Delaware 
determined that the workers’ wives failed to state a claim because 
they made no showing of present physical injury or actual exposure 
to the asbestos.234 
District of Columbia235 
Florida 
In Petito, the plaintiffs brought a class action against 
pharmaceutical manufacturers and sellers seeking an injunction 
requiring the defendants to fund a court supervised medical 
monitoring program for conditions caused by the plaintiff’s use of 
weight-loss drugs.236  At the time of the claim, the plaintiffs did not 
have physical injuries as a result of using the drugs.237  Nonetheless, 
the Florida District Court of Appeal held that Florida would 
recognize an action for medical monitoring absent physical injury 
if the plaintiffs could show the monitoring was reasonably 
necessary.238 
Guam 
In Abuan, the plaintiffs were allegedly exposed to PCBs, 
dioxins, and furans when the transformer on a junction box 
ruptured.239  Plaintiffs brought a class action against the PCB 
manufacturer and the manufacturer of the electrical transformer, 
 
 232. Mergenthaler v. Asbestos Corp. of Am., 480 A.2d 647, 649 (Del. 1984). 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. at 651. 
 235. See supra Part II.A. 
 236. Petito v. A.H. Robins Co., 750 So. 2d 103, 104-05 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1999). 
 237. Id. at 104.  In response, defendants filed a motion for judgment on the 
pleadings, contending that the state of Florida does not recognize claims for the 
costs of medical monitoring absent injury.  Id. at 105. 
 238. Id. at 105.  The court later stated: “We find nothing in Florida law barring 
such a claim and caselaw [sic], equity, common sense, and the decisions of courts 
around the country persuade us that under the limited and appropriate 
circumstances outlined herein, such a claim is viable and necessary to do justice.”  
Id. at 108 (footnote omitted). 
 239. Abuan v. Gen. Elec. Co., 3 F.3d 329, 331 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 
U.S. 1116 (1994). 
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seeking, among other things, to recover the costs of medical 
monitoring.240  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that 
because the plaintiffs could not show that they suffered a 
“significantly increased risk of contracting a serious latent disease,” 
the district court properly granted the manufacturers’ motion for 
summary judgment on plaintiff’s claim for medical monitoring 
damages.241 
Illinois 
In Carey v. Kerr-McGee Chemical LLC, the U.S. District Court for 
the Northern District of Illinois stated that “[n]either the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit nor any Illinois reviewing 
court has decided” whether the State of Illinois would recognize a 
claim for medical monitoring absent present physical injury.242  
Similarly, in Guillory v. American Tobacco Co., the court stated, “[i]t 
should be noted . . . that it is far from clear whether Illinois 
recognizes medical monitoring as an independent cause of 
action.”243  However, in Lewis, the Illinois Appellate Court 
considered whether, unlike recovery for an increased risk of future 
harm in a tort action, “the cost of diagnostic testing to detect a 
possible injury . . . is in itself a present injury compensable in a tort 
action,” even in the absence of any present physical injury.244  The 
court reasoned that, “a claim seeking damages for the cost of a 
medical examination is not speculative and the necessity for such 
an examination is capable of proof within a ‘reasonable degree of 
medical certainty.’”245 
 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. at 344-35.  The court adopted the framework of Ayers, stating that in 
order to recover the expenses associated with medical monitoring the plaintiffs 
must show: 
1. Plaintiff was significantly exposed to a proven hazardous substance 
through the negligent actions of the defendant. 
2. As a proximate result of exposure, plaintiff suffers a significantly 
increased risk of contracting a serious latent disease. 
3. That increased risk makes periodic diagnostic medical examinations 
reasonably necessary. 
4. Monitoring and testing procedures exist which make the early 
detection and treatment of the disease possible and beneficial. 
Id. at 335. 
 242. No. 96 C 8583, 1999 WL 966484, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 1999). 
 243. No. 97 C 8641, 2001 WL 290603, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 20, 2001). 
 244. Lewis v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 793 N.E.2d 869, 873 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003). 
 245. Id. at 874. 
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Indiana 
In Baker, the plaintiff homeowner brought a claim against the 
defendant employer, alleging the defendant allowed the plaintiff to 
take scrap insulation home for personal use despite the 
defendant’s knowledge that the insulation was contaminated with 
PCBs.246  The complaint alleged a number of claims, and sought 
compensation for, among other things, the costs of future medical 
monitoring.247  The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of 
Indiana granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s 
claims for future medical monitoring expenses without prejudice.248  
The district court allowed the plaintiffs an opportunity to amend 
their medical monitoring claim to allege a present physical injury 
caused by the contaminated insulation.249  The district court 
subsequently dismissed the plaintiff’s claims for medical 
monitoring expenses after it found the plaintiff had not suffered 
any physical injury caused by exposure to PCBs.250  On appeal, the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s 
findings, holding that the plaintiffs’ waiver of all damages claims, 
including the medical monitoring claim, precluded the plaintiff’s 
right to challenge the district court’s rulings.251 
Kansas 
In Burton, the plaintiff, a smoker who suffered from disease, 
brought a number of claims against manufacturers of cigarettes.252  
The defendants brought a motion to dismiss arguing, in part, that 
Kansas had not adopted medical monitoring as an independent 
cause of action.253  The U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas 
agreed, holding that the plaintiff’s claim for medical monitoring 
was “merely a component of plaintiff’s damages relating to his 
other claims.”254  Thus, the court granted the defendant’s motion to 
dismiss the plaintiff’s medical monitoring claim, in effect holding 
that Kansas allows for the recovery of medical monitoring expenses 
in the form of damages when such expenses are related to a 
 
 246. Baker v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 70 F.3d 951, 952 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 247. Id. at 953. 
 248. Id. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. 
 251. Id. at 955. 
 252. Burton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 884 F. Supp. 1515, 1517-18 (D. Kan. 
1995). 
 253. Id. at 1518. 
 254. Id. at 1523. 
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present physical injury.255 
Kentucky 
In Wood, the plaintiff, who had consumed diet drugs, brought 
an action against the drug manufacturer.256  The plaintiff alleged 
increased health risks resulting from the drug, and sought medical 
monitoring expenses and the establishment of a monitoring 
fund.257  At the time the plaintiff brought suit, the plaintiff had not 
suffered from any injury as a result of using the diet drugs.258  The 
Supreme Court of Kentucky rejected the plaintiff’s claim for 
medical monitoring damages absent a showing of present physical 
injury.259 
Maryland 
In Philip Morris Inc., the plaintiffs, current and former tobacco 
users, claimed to have been injured by tobacco use and brought an 
action against tobacco manufacturers.260  The plaintiffs sought, in 
part, injunctive relief through a court-supervised medical 
monitoring fund to be funded by the defendants.261  The Maryland 
Court of Appeals granted the defendants’ petition for writ of 
mandamus and prohibition seeking decertification of the plaintiffs’ 
classes.262  In doing so, the court noted that it had not yet addressed 
the issue of whether medical monitoring is a valid cause of action 
or remedy in Maryland, and while the court recognized it would 
need to do so eventually, the issue was not yet ripe for its 
decision.263 
Michigan 
In Henry, the plaintiff residents brought an action against a 
chemical company alleging that the defendant negligently released 
dioxin from its plant.264  The plaintiffs sought the creation of a 
 
 255. Id.; see also Cott v. Peppermint Twist Mgmt. Co., 856 P.2d 906, 922 (Kan. 
1993) (permitting recovery by plaintiffs for the costs of medical monitoring when 
such expenses were associated with a present physical injury). 
 256. Wood v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., 82 S.W.3d 849, 851 (Ky. 2002). 
 257. Id. 
 258. Id. 
 259. Id. at 859.  Specifically, the court concluded “having weighed the few 
potential benefits against the many almost-certain problems of medical 
monitoring, we are convinced that this Court has little reason to allow such a 
remedy without a showing of present physical injury.”  Id. 
 260. Philip Morris Inc. v. Angeletti, 752 A.2d 200, 205 (Md. 2000). 
 261. Id. at 206. 
 262. See id. at 205. 
 263. Id. at 251. 
 264. Henry v. Dow Chem. Co., 701 N.W.2d 684, 685-86 (Mich. 2005).  Dioxin is 
a synthetic chemical that can potentially be hazardous to human health.  Id. 
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court-supervised program, paid for by the defendant, which would 
monitor the class for possible manifestations of dioxin-related 
disease.265  The defendant moved to dismiss the medical 
monitoring claim on the ground that the claim was not recognized 
in Michigan.266  The circuit court subsequently denied the motion 
and the Michigan Court of Appeals denied the defendant’s 
application for interlocutory appeal.267  The Michigan Supreme 
Court reversed and remanded for summary disposition in favor of 
the defendant on the plaintiffs’ medical monitoring claim.268  The 
court held that the plaintiffs did not present a cognizable 
negligence claim under Michigan common law because the 
plaintiffs failed to allege a present physical injury.269 
Minnesota270 
Missouri 
In Thomas, the plaintiffs brought an action against a defendant 
corporation that allegedly caused groundwater contamination to 
which the plaintiffs were allegedly exposed.271  The U.S. District 
Court for the Western District of Missouri stated that 
“[e]ntitlement to the costs of future medical monitoring requires 
plaintiff to prove actual present injury and an increased risk of 
future harm.”272  Because the plaintiffs did not present evidence of 
actual physical injury, the court granted the defendants motion for 
summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ medical monitoring claim.273 
Montana 
In Lamping, a Montana state district court, in an unreported 
decision, recognized a cause of action for medical monitoring, 
stating that “‘the patient’s independent claim for medical 
monitoring accrues when the patient can meet all of the elements 
 
 265. Id. at 686. 
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. 
 268. Id. 
 269. Id.  The court explained that merely being exposed to toxins with the 
increased risk of future harm does not constitute an “injury” for tort law purposes.  
Id. at 688-89.  Rather, “[i]t is a present injury, not fear of an injury in the future, 
that gives rise to a cause of action under negligence theory.”  Id. at 689. 
 270. See supra Part III. 
 271. Thomas v. FAG Bearings Corp., 846 F. Supp. 1400, 1403-04 (W.D. Mo. 
1994). 
 272. Id. at 1410. 
 273. Id.  The court noted, however, that if and when the plaintiffs exhibit 
injuries at some time in the future, the plaintiffs should “be able to bring such 
claims without suffering preclusive effects.”  Id. at 1411. 
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of the claim, which notably does not include an actual physical 
injury element.’”274 
Nebraska 
In Trimble, plaintiffs who resided near a former lead refinery 
brought a class action against the owner and former operator of 
the plant alleging that their properties had been contaminated by 
pollutants from the site.275  The plaintiffs also brought a state law 
claim for medical monitoring.276  The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found that the plaintiffs’ claim for 
medical monitoring expenses in the absence of a present physical 
injury was not cognizable under Nebraska law.277 
Nevada 
In Badillo, smokers and casino employees brought a class 
action against the defendants.278  The plaintiffs sought the 
establishment of a court-supervised medical monitoring fund to 
help diagnose and treat tobacco-related illnesses.279  The Supreme 
Court of Nevada, after accepting the certified question from the 
U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada, determined that the 
common law of Nevada did not recognize a cause of action for 
medical monitoring.280 
 
 274. In re St. Jude Med., Inc. Silzone Heart Valves Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 
01-1396, 2004 WL 45504, at *7 (D. Minn. Jan. 5, 2004) (quoting Lamping v. Am. 
Home Prods., Inc., No. DV-97-85786 (Mont. 4th Dist. Ct. Feb. 2, 2000)).  The 
court adopted the elements for a claim set forth by the Florida District Court of 
Appeals in Petito.  Id.   
 275. Trimble v. Asarco, Inc., 232 F.3d 946, 950 (8th Cir. 2000), abrogated on 
procedural grounds Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs. Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2611 
(2005). 
 276. Id. 
 277. Id. at 963.  The court agreed with the earlier prediction of the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Nebraska that the state of Nebraska would not 
recognize a claim for medical monitoring, which reasoned: 
[T]he plaintiffs have cited no authority, and the court has found none, 
which would suggest that Nebraska law recognizes either a cause of 
action for medical monitoring or a remedy involving the creation of a 
medical monitoring fund.  There exists no pending or prospective 
legislation to authorize a cause of action or a remedy for medical 
monitoring, and the court finds it improbable that the Nebraska courts 
would judicially fashion such a right or remedy. 
Id. (quoting Trimble v. ASARCO Inc., 83 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1041 (D. Neb. 1999)). 
 278. Badillo v. Am. Brands, Inc., 16 P.3d 435, 438 (Nev. 2001). 
 279. Id. 
 280. Id. at 440.  The court did state that a remedy of medical monitoring could 
be available depending on the underlying cause of action.  Id. at 441.  While the 
court noted the fact that there is not agreement among other jurisdictions as to 
whether a present physical injury is necessary for a medical monitoring claim, the 
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New Jersey 
In Ayers, the township residents brought an action against the 
municipality when toxic pollutants leached into a water aquifer 
from a landfill operated by the municipality.281  The New Jersey 
Supreme Court held that medical monitoring expenses should be 
awarded to the residents based upon an enhanced, although 
unquantified, risk of future disease because of the plaintiffs’ 
exposure to the pollutants.282 
New York 
In Patton, an employee brought suit against the defendants for 
improper removal and exposure to asbestos.283  The plaintiff sought 
damages including costs of future medical monitoring.284  The U.S. 
District Court for the Western District of New York predicted that 
the New York Court of Appeals would recognize a cause of action 
for medical surveillance absent proof of injury.285 
 
court did not address the issue of whether a present physical injury would be 
necessary for such a remedy in Nevada.  See id. 
 281. Ayers v. Twp. of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 291 (N.J. 1987). 
 282. Id. at 313.  Thus, the court concluded that the plaintiffs were not required 
to demonstrate a prior injury from exposure before recovering the expenses of 
future medical monitoring.  The court stated that: 
[W]e hold that the cost of medical surveillance is a compensable item of 
damages where the proofs demonstrate, through reliable expert 
testimony predicated upon the significance and extent of exposure to 
chemicals, the toxicity of the chemicals, the seriousness of the diseases 
for which individuals are at risk, the relative increase in the chance of 
onset of disease in those exposed, and the value of early diagnosis, that 
such surveillance to monitor the effect of exposure to toxic chemicals is 
reasonable and necessary. 
Id. at 312; see also Theer v. Philip Carey Co., 628 A.2d 724, 733 (N.J. 1993) 
(concluding that “medical surveillance damages are not available for plaintiffs who 
have not experienced direct and hence discrete exposure to a toxic substance and 
who have not suffered an injury or condition resulting from that exposure”).  Ayers 
is considered by some commentators to be the “seminal decision” allowing 
recovery for medical surveillance in the absence of present physical injury.  
Henderson & Twerski, supra note 6, at 839; see also Klein, supra note 155, at 6 
(noting that Friends for All Children did not break ground in allowing medical 
surveillance claims). 
 283. Patton v. Gen. Signal Corp., 984 F. Supp. 666, 667-68 (W.D.N.Y. 1997). 
 284. Id. at 668. 
 285. Id. at 673; see also Askey v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 477 N.Y.S.2d 242, 247 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (“Medical monitoring could be a recoverable consequential 
damage provided that plaintiffs can establish with a reasonable degree of medical 
certainty that such expenditures are ‘reasonably anticipated’ to be incurred by 
reason of their exposure.”).  But see Abusio v. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. Inc., 656 
N.Y.S.2d 371, 371-72 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (holding that for a plaintiff to maintain 
a cause of action for future medical monitoring costs “plaintiff must establish both 
that he or she was in fact exposed to the disease-causing agent and that there is a 
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North Carolina 
In Carroll, the plaintiffs alleged exposure to chemicals 
including TCE emanating from the defendant’s plant.286  The 
plaintiffs sought costs for medical surveillance “to detect the onset 
of any symptoms of diseases caused by the chemicals.”287  The court 
held that it “should not recognize a common law claim for the costs 
of medical monitoring in the absence of clear direction from the 
North Carolina courts or legislature.”288  The court further noted 
that North Carolina courts “if faced with the question of whether to 
create a tort . . . for medical monitoring costs . . . would decline to 
create such a tort.”289 
Ohio 
In Day, employee workers and frequenters of a nuclear 
weapons components manufacturing plant brought a class action 
against the manufacturer for exposure to radiation.290  The 
plaintiffs sought a court supervised medical surveillance program.291  
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio held that 
the plaintiffs could recover for medical monitoring if they could 
“show by expert medical testimony that they have increased risk of 
disease which would warrant a reasonable physician to order 
monitoring.”292 
Pennsylvania 
In Redland Soccer Club, Inc., the plaintiffs brought an action 
against the defendants alleging that the defendants’ disposal of 
 
‘rational basis’ for his or her fear of contracting the disease”; where “rational basis” 
means “the clinically demonstrable presence” of disease in plaintiff’s body). 
 286. Carroll v. Litton Sys., Inc., No. B-C-88-253, 1990 WL 312969, at *1 
(W.D.N.C. Oct. 29, 1990). 
 287. Id. at *2. 
 288. Id. at *51. 
 289. Id.  The court later stated that even if North Carolina courts would in fact 
recognize a cause of action for medical monitoring, the plaintiffs’ claims would 
fail here because of the lack of evidence that the plaintiffs would contract any 
disease in the future.  Id. at *53;  see also Ashcraft v. Conoco, Inc., 218 F.3d 282, 285 
(4th Cir. 2000) (noting a jury award of $9.5 million for medical monitoring 
damages, although not stating the test used by the court). 
 290. Day v. NLO, 851 F. Supp. 869, 874 (S.D. Ohio 1994). 
 291. Id. at 875. 
 292. Id. at 881.  The court further provided that “[t]he monitoring must be 
directed toward the disease for which the tort victim is at risk, and will only 
include procedures which are medically prudent in light of that risk as opposed to 
measures aimed at general health.”  Id.; see also McCafferty v. Centerior Serv. Co., 
983 F. Supp. 715, 731 (N.D. Ohio 1997) (“Plaintiffs’ claim for medical monitoring 
is dependent upon a finding of liability for a substantive cause of action.”). 
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hazardous materials caused the plaintiffs harm.293  The plaintiffs 
sought the establishment of a medical monitoring trust fund to pay 
for physical examinations.294  The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
set forth the requirements for bringing a medical monitoring 
claim, which did not require a present physical injury for 
recovery.295 
Puerto Rico 
In Barreras Ruiz, persons who had purchased and smoked 
cigarettes, nicotine dependent cigarette smokers, and their 
relatives brought a motion for class certification in an action 
against tobacco manufacturers.296  Plaintiffs sought to recover 
damages resulting from their addiction, as well as the costs of 
medical monitoring.297  In denying plaintiffs’ motion for class 
certification, the U.S. District Court for the District of Puerto Rico 
noted: “[W]e will not consider the substantive question of whether 
Puerto Rico law authorizes medical monitoring.”298  
South Carolina 
In Rosmer, the plaintiff allegedly contracted hepatitis by using a 
prescription antibiotic designed by the defendant.299  In denying 
the plaintiff’s motion to certify a medical monitoring class, the U.S. 
District Court for the District of South Carolina stated that “South 
Carolina has not recognized a cause of action for medical 
monitoring.”300 
Tennessee 
In Craft, the plaintiffs, a group of women who unknowingly 
ingested radioactive isotopes while pregnant, brought suit on 
behalf of themselves and their children.301  The U.S. District Court 
for the Middle District of Tennessee certified the class of exposed 
women and children under Rule 23(b)(2) for their medical 
 
 293. Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v. Dep’t of the Army, 696 A.2d 137, 139 (Pa. 
1997). 
 294. Id. at 139-40. 
 295. See id. at 145-46. 
 296. Barreras Ruiz v. Am. Tobacco Co., 180 F.R.D. 194, 195 (D.P.R. 1998). 
 297. Id.  
 298. Id. at 197.  The court denied plaintiffs’ motion to certify the class “based 
on the proposed class action’s lack of superiority over individual actions” and “the 
lack of a predominance of common issues among the members of the proposed 
class.”  Id. at 199. 
 299. Rosmer v. Pfizer, Inc., No. CIV.A. 9:99-2280-18RB, 2001 WL 34010613, at 
*1 (D.S.C. Mar. 20, 2001). 
 300. Id. at *5. 
 301. Craft v. Vanderbilt Univ., 174 F.R.D. 396, 400 (M.D. Tenn. 1996). 
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monitoring claim.302  The court, however, did not discuss the 
elements of a medical monitoring claim in the state of 
Tennessee.303 
Texas 
In Norwood, plaintiffs allegedly exposed to radars brought suit 
against defendant designers, manufacturers, and marketers of 
radar equipment.304  Plaintiffs sought to certify two classes, 
including a medical monitoring class consisting of individuals 
exposed to radiation but not suffering from illness or injury as a 
result of such exposure.305  Defendants brought a motion to dismiss 
plaintiffs’ medical monitoring claims, arguing that Texas did not 
recognize medical monitoring as a cause of action.306   The U.S. 
District Court for the Western District of Texas granted defendants’ 
motion to dismiss, holding that while “Texas courts have not had 
occasion to address medical monitoring as a cause of action,” the 
Texas Supreme Court would likely reject medical monitoring 
claims absent a present physical injury. 307   
Utah 
In Hansen, renovation workers brought an action against the 
owner of an office building seeking to recover the costs of medical 
monitoring arising from the plaintiffs’ exposure to asbestos while 
performing renovation work.308  The Supreme Court of Utah set 
forth the test to use in determining whether to award medical 
monitoring expenses, noting specifically that the trial court applied 
the “wrong legal standard” when it granted the defendants’ motion 
for summary judgment because “no bodily injury [had] been 
 
 302. Id. at 406-07. 
 303. See id.; see also Daniels v. Combustion Eng’g, Inc., 583 S.W.2d 768 (Tenn. 
Ct. App. 1978) (declining to address the issue of medical surveillance expenses 
where an employee who installed asbestos-related insulation contracted asbestosis 
and brought an action against insulation manufacturers). 
 304. Norwood v. Raytheon Co., No. EP-04-CA-127-PRM, 2006 WL 267335, at *1 
(W.D. Tex. Jan. 17, 2006).   
 305. Id.  Specifically, the medical monitoring plaintiffs sought the 
establishment of a court administered medical monitoring fund to pay for medical 
surveillance “deemed reasonably and medically necessary” to protect the plaintiffs 
“from an increased risk of harm and disease.”  Id. at *2.    
 306. Id.   
 307. Id. at *5, 7.  The court stated that the “Texas Supreme Court appears 
disposed to rely on the same policy considerations in rejecting medical monitoring 
claims that it relied on in rejecting mental anguish claims in the absense of a 
present physical injury.”  Id. at *5.   
 308. Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply, 858 P.2d 970, 972-73 (Utah 1993).  
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manifested [by the] plaintiff.”309 
Virginia 
In Ball, the plaintiffs, mostly former employees who had been 
exposed to toxic chemicals, brought an action against their 
employer seeking to recover damages for the cost of medical 
surveillance necessitated by their exposure.310  The U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the plaintiffs failed to show 
that they were suffering from present physical injury, and thus they 
could not recover the expenses of medical monitoring under 
Virginia law.311 
Virgin Islands 
In Purjet, the plaintiff brought suit alleging repeated exposure 
to asbestos at defendant’s refinery over the course of his 
employment as an insulation supervisor.312  Plaintiff also brought 
suit on behalf of his daughter, who was also allegedly exposed to 
asbestos that plaintiff brought home on his clothing.313  At the time 
plaintiffs brought suit, neither was presently suffering from any 
asbestos-related disease.314  Defendant brought a motion for 
summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiffs failed to state a 
legally cognizable claim.315  The court granted defendant’s motion 
for summary judgment, stating that actual injury is a prerequisite to 
a claim for medical monitoring in the Virgin Islands.316 
Washington 
In Duncan, the plaintiff, a nonsmoking flight attendant, 
brought a class action against the employer defendant claiming 
damages for personal injuries suffered from exposure to second-
hand smoke on flights.317  The plaintiff asserted a claim for medical 
 
 309. Id. at 979, 981. 
 310. Ball v. Joy Techs., Inc., 958 F.2d 36, 37 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 
U.S. 1033 (1992). 
 311. Id. at 39.  The court, analyzing the case under Virginia and West Virginia 
law, similarly held that plaintiffs could not recover medical surveillance costs 
under the law of West Virginia absent present physical injury.  Id.  But see Bower v. 
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 522 S.E.2d 424, 430 (W. Va. 1999) (rejecting “the 
contention that a claim for future medical expenses must rest upon the existence 
of present physical harm”). 
 312. Purjet v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp., Civ. No. 1985/284, 1986 WL 1200, 
at *1 (V.I. Jan. 8, 1996). 
 313. Id.  Plaintiffs asserted four separate claims, including one for medical 
monitoring.  Id. 
 314. Id. 
 315. Id.  
 316. Id. at *4. 
 317. Duncan v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 203 F.R.D. 601, 603 (W.D. Wash. 2001). 
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monitoring.318  The U.S. District Court for the Western District of 
Washington held that the Washington Supreme Court would not 
recognize a stand-alone cause of action for medical monitoring.319  
The court did, however, note that the “plaintiffs with a present 
[physical] injury may seek medical monitoring as a remedy to a 
negligence cause of action under existing Washington law.”320 
West Virginia321 
 
 318. Id. 
 319. Id. at 606. 
 320. Id. 
 321. See supra Part II.C. 
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